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ABSTRACT 
In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class 
amphibious assault ship.  In December 2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to 
move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships, with the option of 
building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard.  Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union 
ever possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class.  An amphibious assault 
ship would be a new addition to the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal.  The fact that Russia 
must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities indicates that Russia’s 
domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships.  The 
Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country 
that some still see as a threat.  For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller 
NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside their security concerns for 
national and economic reasons.  This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by 
Russia’s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies, 
rather than increase its amphibious assault capabilities per se. 
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This thesis examines Russia’s decision to acquire the Mistral class LHD (Landing 
Helicopter Dock) warships from France.  This purchase marks a departure for the Russian 
Navy that to date has only briefly counted ASW (Anti Submarine Warfare) helicopter 
carriers in its inventory.  Russia’s amphibious warfare fleet is primarily built around LST 
(Landing Ship Tank) style vessels that lack an over the horizon amphibious assault 
capability.  The purchase of up to four Mistrals would be the first major foreign arms 
purchase by the USSR/Russia since World War II.  The current agreement between 
Russia and France is for two Mistrals to be constructed in France, followed by two more 
Mistrals to be built in a Russian shipyard, likely in the St. Petersburg region.  While as of 
May 2011 price and contract specifics are still being negotiated, it is likely the sale will 
still proceed. 
The argument of this thesis is that Russia seeks to acquire the Mistral’s up to date 
command and control systems and modern, modular French shipbuilding technologies 
rather than upgrade their amphibious assault capability.  If capability were the driving 
force, the contract negotiations would surely have been concluded by now in the interest 
of faster construction timelines.  The Russians see the Mistral as a way to help modernize 
their defense industry and navy. At present, no Russian shipyard can replicate the 
modular techniques used by the French to build a Mistral.  
The fact that Russia originally identified the Mistral as its priority before 
announcing a need for a LHD capability means that the ship preceded the mission, which 
the Russians have struggled to define.  While the principal attractiveness of the multi–
mission Mistral to Moscow lies in the ship’s technologies and construction techniques, a   
LHD style vessel also allows Russia to add large capital warships, which are ideal for soft 
power missions.  There is little indication that Russia is seriously upgrading its ability to 
conduct an opposed amphibious landing. The Mistral breaks new ground because it 
marks the first major arms sale to Russia by a NATO member.  The reactions by some of 
the smaller NATO members, the Baltic nations and Poland among them, have muted 
enthusiasm outside of France and Russia for a potential maritime game-changer on 
 xvi
Russia’s maritime periphery.  The Baltic states’ inability to shake French determination 
to see the sale through has convinced them that their security concerns are trumped by 
economic considerations—in this case jobs for French workers.  This has also caused 
many to question France’s, and by extension NATO’s, commitment to its Baltic partners 
in a showdown with Russia.  In response to the apparently shifting strategic environment 
and questions about NATO resolve, the Baltic nations have approached some 
Scandinavian countries about possible defense pacts.  In true Gallic fashion, Paris argues 
the illogicality of calling Russia a strategic partner, while refusing to sell it arms.  France 
has also downplayed the new capabilities that the Mistral would bring to Russia.  But the 
lack of pre-sale consultation coupled with Paris’ apparent  lack of concern for legitimate 
security implications of the sale has left many in the Baltic region unhappy, despite 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept unveiled at the 2010 Lisbon Summit that sought to 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In August 2009, Russia opened official negotiations with France to purchase the 
Mistral class amphibious assault ship.  Russia has purchased warships from foreign 
countries since Peter the Great ordered ships from Holland to create the Russian Navy. 
However, since World War II, Russia has always produced its own major warships.  Now 
Moscow seems eager to acquire a 21,000 ton warship manufactured abroad.  Why does 
Russia now need a helicopter carrying, amphibious assault warship which heretofore it 
never possessed, even during the era of the Soviet Union?  Furthermore, why is Russia 
looking to the West, particularly France, for its purchase?  What capability will four 
Mistral class vessels bring to the Russian Navy and how might they be employed?  On 
Christmas Eve, 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev telephoned French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy to confirm that Russia is going forward with plans to buy two French 
built Mistrals and discussing building two more in Russia under license. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
There are at least two reasons why this sale is worth investigating.  First, during 
the days of the Soviet Union, major Soviet warships were built in Soviet shipyards.  The 
fact that the Russian Navy is seriously considering buying foreign warships suggests that 
it can no longer produce the equipment that its military needs.  This potential sale might 
suggest serious research and development problems in the Russian defense industry.  
Have the Russian admirals decided to take their rubles elsewhere because they know they 
will not get what they need from their own suppliers? 
A second reason this study is important concerns the potential mission of an 
amphibious assault warship?  The Soviet Navy never had a warship such as the Mistral.  
Instead the Soviet Navy focused on smaller tank and dock landing ships, which were 
passed down to the Russian Navy.  However, none have the capability or size of a Mistral 
class vessel.  The addition of Mistral type vessels will potentially bring a power 
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projection capability to the Russian Navy.  But why does it need one?  And where might 
the Russian Navy be looking to project power?  The answer to this question may 
indication Moscow’s strategic priorities. 
Capability may indicate intention. However, the desire to project power does not 
mean that the Russian Navy can support and escort a Mistral class ship.  Is Russia’s Navy 
serious about becoming an international player on the high seas, or does this sale 
represent an operational upgrade without a clear strategic concept?  The answer to these 
questions requires a preliminary analysis of Russian Navy capability gaps and whether 
the Mistral or another vessel would fill them.  This analysis will give a solid indication of 
what improvements, if any, one can expect in the Russian Navy.  
This thesis will also address the potential impact of Russian naval purchases on 
NATO cohesion.  On the one side is France, a prominent NATO member, with a history 
of independence and a politically powerful armaments industry eager to sell major 
weapons systems to Russia.  On the other side are the Baltic nations who are very 
concerned about the sale, as is Georgia, which aspires to NATO membership.  Does 
NATO simply sweep aside the concerns of smaller, weaker members and potential 
members?  Or will NATO cohesion be undermined by the interests of the French 
armaments industry and Paris’ requirement to create domestic jobs?  As NATO moves 
forward, what impact might sales of weapons systems such as the Mistral have on 
alliance solidarity and relevance?   
C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS 
From the Russian perspective, there are a myriad of possible explanations behind 
their desire to complete this sale.  The main research will focus on the balance between 
military and political drivers of this decision.  The Mistral design was a contender for the 
Royal Australian Navy’s tender for an amphibious assault ship, a competition won by a 
Spanish design.1  Paris has shopped the Mistral to countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
                                                 
1 Nick Brown, “Spanish Designs are Australia's Choice for Warship Programmes,” International 
Defence Daily (August 1, 2007). 
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Turkey2, but so far has found no takers.  Obviously, a sale to Russia would both justify 
the French investment, enhance French diplomatic clout, and showcase the Mistral’s 
capabilities.  
Research will reveal that Russia is looking to acquire the Mistral for 
technological, political, and military reasons.  The main driver in Russia’s interest is 
acquisition of the technologies.  This interest in technologies covers both the modern 
command and control systems found in the Mistral and those technologies that are 
required to build the Mistral.  These new shipbuilding technologies will allow Russia to 
modernize its shipyards from their Soviet-era capabilities.  
The political benefit follows from the fact that the purchase of these warships 
allows Russia to create discord among NATO allies.  While Russia does not anticipate a 
NATO invasion, Moscow would miss no opportunity to sow discord within NATO by 
pitting the smaller members against larger European ones who put their own national 
interests above the collective concerns of the alliance.  Finally, while a quest for 
enhanced military capabilities are not the main drivers of the sale, they offer an important 
side benefit.  The Mistral would give a once proud Russian Navy four modern capital 
ships.  These would  add to the Russian Navy’s existing capital ships inventory that 
include the heavy nuclear powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky (Peter the Great) and the 
heavy aircraft carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov.  The Mistral vessels are well adapted 
to a peacetime role of humanitarian disaster response and littoral military action rather 
than amphibious operations against a defended shoreline.  The acquisition of corvettes, 
frigates and destroyers probably make the most sense from a purely military capability 
perspective. But a 7,000 ton destroyer cannot project power and show the flag as well as 
a 21,000 ton helicopter carrier with 16 helicopters.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Galrahn, “Wanted: Big Amphibious Ships,” Information Dissemination, 
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/11/wanted-big-amphibious-ships.html (accessed November 
25, 2010). 
 4
Moscow seems to care more about image than creating a balanced battle fleet.  
For example, in addition to the purchase of the Mistral, the navy looks to put one or two 
mothballed Kirov class battle cruisers (Project 1144) back in service.3  These are all 
impressive capital ships, but all require escort ships to operate effectively in a combat 
environment.  Because the emphasis is on the Russian Navy’s image and not true combat 
capability, the Mistral would appear to fit nicely into the navy’s plans of limited power 
projection.  The addition of Mistrals into the Russian fleet also fits into the navy’s plan of 
adding warships as quick as possible to replace outdated vessels.  The Russian Navy is 
not critically in need of a helicopter platform such as a Mistral.  The Mistral though gives 
the ability for the Russian Navy to gain advanced technology and modern building 
techniques.  Mere capability is not the driving force behind the sale. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many countries are becoming interested in aviation capable amphibious warships.  
One main reason is that the idea of the World War Two style assault from waves of 
landing craft may no longer make sense against defended positions.4  To get around this 
problem, many navies have shifted to the idea of rapidly transporting troops ashore via 
assault helicopters.  Besides the United States, which is the clear leader in both numbers 
and types of amphibious assault warships, England, France, Spain, Australia, Canada, 
South Korea, Japan, Brazil, India, the Netherlands, Italy, Singapore, Greece, Indonesia 
and China all possess or are in the process of acquiring amphibious assault warships.   
Amphibious warships can be used for far more than simply assaulting enemy 
beaches, however.  An amphibious warship can also be used to project power, provide 
military support or medical relief inland from the sea, all without the use of formal ports, 
beaching sites or airfields.5  Military operations are not the exclusive domain of 
                                                 
3 At 28,000 tons, the nuclear-powered heavy missile cruiser (also referred to as battlecruiser by the 
West) Kirov class was the largest non aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ships constructed since the end 
of World War II.  Russia currently has only one, the Peter the Great, in operational service.  “Russia Plans 
to Upgrade 3 Nuclear-Powered Cruisers by 2020 (Update 1),” RIA Novosti, August 25, 2010. 
4 Massimo Annati, “Amphibious Flat-Decks: Multi-Purpose Ships for Expeditionary Operations,” 
Naval Forces 4, no. 28 (2007), 49. 
5 Tim Fish, “Amphibious Assault Ships: Striking Distance,” Jane's Defence Weekly (June 15, 2010). 
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amphibious assault warships: perhaps one of the best examples of their civilian use was 
for humanitarian relief, seen in Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake or tsunami relief 
of Indonesia in 2005.6  Another use has been to evacuate civilians from crises erupting in 
foreign countries, as shown by the French use of the Mistral (L-9013) during the 
evacuation of European civilians from Beirut and Larnaca in 2006.7 
Simply grouping all amphibious assault vessels under one title is incorrect, 
however.  To compare accurately different vessels of various navies, it is important to 
distinguish between distinct vessels and their exact roles.  The Naval Institute Guide to 
Combat Fleets of the World defines amphibious warships in the following classes8: 
LPH – Amphibious Warfare Helicopter Carrier - Major ships intended primarily 
to operate helicopters to transport embarked troops.  In this overall classification, the U.S. 
Navy has the LPH (Landing Platform Helicopter), LHD (Landing Helicopter Dock) and 
LHA (Landing Helicopter Assault).   
LPD – Amphibious transport docks or Landing Platform dock – These are major 
ships designed to carry and launch landing craft from a wet well deck at the stern. 
LSD – Dock landing ship - Same primary role as a LPD but with the cargo being 
predominantly cargo vice troops. 
LST – Tank Landing ship - Ships designed to beach and discharge cargo and 
troops via a bow ramp system. 
LCU- Utility landing craft – Larger, generally open topped, bow ramp-equipped 
landing craft capable of transporting at least 100 metric tons of vehicles and personnel to 
a beach.  Most LCU are not large enough to make extended ocean crossing, instead most 
can be transported inside a well deck of a large ship. 
The U.S. Naval Institute classifies the Mistral as a LHD type vessel.  The French 
though classify the Mistral as a “Bâtiment de Projection et de Commandement” (Forward 
                                                 
6 Fish, “Amphibious Assault Ships: Striking Distance.” 
7 Hartmut Manseck, “BPC “Mistral” Class,” Naval Forces 28, no. 1 (2007), 89. 
8 Eric Wertheim, ed., Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 15th ed. (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2007), xxiii. 
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Deployment and Command Vessel) or BPC type vessel, one that can perform the duties 
of a LHD but also has a significant command and control capability.  
 
Figure 1.   French Mistral Class LHD/BPC Mistral and Tonnere underway (From 
Yannick Le Bris, shipshape.fr, 2006) 
The Russian Navy or Soviet Navy, for that matter, never possessed any vessels of 
a LPH/LHD class.  The only helicopter carriers the Soviet Navy ever operated were the 
Project 1123 Kondor class (Moskva and Leningrad).  These vessels, while capable of 
carrying 14 helicopters and later Yak-38 FORGER vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, 
were designed and utilized in the role of “submarine chasers”, not for amphibious 
warfare.9  These vessels are no longer in service and were sold in the late 1990s for scrap 
metal to India. 
                                                 
9 “Russian Navy Considers Acquisition of Mistral Class Assault Ship,” ITAR-TASS, August 4, 2010. 
 7
 
Figure 2.   Lenningrad in service circa 1990 (From U.S. Navy) 
The Soviets at one time had plans of their own LHA type, the Project 11780 
LHA.10  However, due to economic decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, 
construction on these vessels never took place.  Instead, what the Soviet Union passed 
down to Russia was a single class of LPDs, the Ivan Rogov (Project 1174) and the 
smaller Alligator (Project 1171) LSTs and Ropucha class LSTs (Project 775/775M). 
                                                 
10 Mikhail Barabanov, “Global Market of Advanced Large Assault Landing Ships,” New Defence 
Order Strategy September, no. 04 (2010). 
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Figure 3.   The Moskva awaiting scrapping in Alang, India11 
 
Figure 4.   LPD Ivan Rogov underway (From U.S. Navy, 2010) 
These vessels are designed primarily to assault a beachhead in one of two ways.  
One method is the LPD/LSTs can offload troops in smaller landing craft or air cushioned 
landing craft who then assault the beach.  The other method is for the LPD/LST to drive 
directly up onto the beach and offload troops via a bow ramp.  The Ivan Rogov class is 
                                                 
11 Bob Henneman, “Shipbreaking Photo Gallery,” All The World’s Battlecruisers / The World’s Last 
Pre-Dreadnoughts, 2011.  http://www.bobhenneman.info/Breakers5.htm  
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the sole Russian amphibious warship design capable of operating and supporting 
helicopters.  However, they only have room for four medium size helicopters.  A Mistral 
style LHD has far more aviation capabilities than anything currently serving in the 
Russian Navy besides the Admiral Kuznetsov.  For simple comparison, the Mistral can 
carry a total of 16 helicopters with six on its flight deck at any one time.12   
Only one of three Ivan Rogov class vessel remains in service today after the first 
two ships were put up for auction in 1999,13 and the third vessel, the Mitrophan 
Moskalenko, has never participated in a single exercise.14  Even with the Rogovs, Russia 
has never had a vessel with the capabilities of a Mistral. 
There are a few major ongoing debates concerning the sale of the Mistral 
warships, the first inside Russia itself over whether the Russian Navy has a need for such 
a warship?  The main argument against the sale is that the Russian Navy has a severe 
shortage of ships in all classes, so it makes no sense to kick start modernization with an 
amphibious warship.  Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Centre of Analysis of Strategies 
and Technologies (CAST) 15 located in Moscow, expresses a view held by many that the 
estimated one to two billion euros that the Mistrals may cost could be better spent 
financing the construction of corvettes, frigates and destroyers, which the Russian Navy 
desperately needs.16   Mikhail Barabanov called the potential purchase as “complete 
madness”, especially because the navy cannot afford to keep its current ships in good 
working condition or pay its officers.17   
Another common argument against the sale is that the Mistral is basically 
unarmed and would need a heavy escort to operate in a combat environment.  Col. Gen. 
                                                 
12 Manseck, BPC “Mistral” Class, 89. 
13 Tim Fish, “Russia Auctions Amphibious Dock Ships,” Jane's Navy International, March 5, 2009. 
14 Barabanov, Global Market of Advanced Large Assault Landing Ships, 23. 
15 Ruslan Pukhov is the director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a Moscow 
based, private think tank specializing in Russian military affairs. 
16 Roger N. McDermott, “Mistral Purchase Disguises Weak Condition of the Black Sea Fleet,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 46 (March 9, 2010). 
17 “Analyst: Russia's Planned Purchase of French Warship 'Insane Scheme',” Interfax-AVN, August 6, 
2009. 
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Leonid Ivashov, the President of the Academy of Geopolitical Affairs, has stated that 
there is no reason for the Russian Navy to acquire a ship that is simply a “cruise vessel 
rather than a warship.”18  The idea of a lightly armed warship contradicts the basic 
Soviet/Russian warship design idea of heavily armed warships which have a significant 
self defense capability.  This can be seen in the Admiral Kuznetsov’s armament, which in 
addition to fixed wing aircraft, also carries multiple long range anti-air and anti-ship 
missiles systems. 
Some former Russian Navy admirals insist that there is no Russian mission 
requirement for a ship of this type.  This includes a former Black Sea Fleet Commander, 
Admiral Vladimr Komoyedov, who has called the Mistral a “tin can” and a “washtub” 
and opposes the purchase as there are not enough Russian warships to escort such a very 
lightly armed vessel.19  Admiral Valentin Selivanov, former chief of the Main Staff and 
deputy Commander in Chief of the Navy, has questioned the rational for an expeditionary 
warfare vessel when Russia has no overseas colonies or interests to protect.20  He 
believes that the Russian Navy should build warships required for a blue water navy, 
such as missile cruisers, aircraft carriers and destroyers, instead of focusing on warships 
to control and affect the littoral regions.  Additionally, since Russia already constructed 
the Ivan Rogov class warships and can still currently construct nuclear submarines, it has 
proven that it does not need to buy from abroad.21   
On the opposing side of the debate features prominent figures in the Russian 
Ministry of Defense and Navy.  The Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral 
Vladimir Vysotskiy, argues that a Mistral style vessel fits into the current Russian 
military focus on a smaller, more mobile force that needs the capability to redeploy 
                                                 
18 “Mistral Helicopter Vessel Inadequate for Tasks Carried Out by Russian Navy - Expert,” Interfax, 
November 30, 2009. 
19 Mikhail Ryabov and Vitaliy Akimov, “Admiral Komoyedov Answered Questions from Readers of 
RIA Novyy Region,” Novyy Region, July 13, 2010. 
20 “Russia: Former Admiral Says Medvedev 'does Not Know' Navy's Real Condition,” Sovetskaya 
Rossiya, December 1, 2009. 
21 Ibid. 
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quickly.  In September 2009, Admiral Vysotskiy referring to the conflict with Georgia, 
made the following statement: 
For example, in the August conflict of last year a ship like that [referring 
to the Mistral] would have allowed the Black Sea Fleet to accomplish its 
missions in 40 minutes, not 26 hours, which was how long it took us.22   
Vysotskiy and Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov believe that a 
Mistral would give the Russian Navy mobility with a platform that could fulfill the roles 
of a helicopter carrier, landing ship, mobile hospital, and command center among 
others.23  Defense Minister Serdyukov has also stated that since the Russian domestic 
industry cannot produce a vessel of this type and is “…lagging behind very much in 
certain areas…” compared to the West, Russia is forced to purchase certain types of 
military products abroad.24  This is in the same theme echoed by Russian President 
Medvedev, who has chastised the Russian industry for its “backwardness, its inability to 
innovate and produce modern equipment to rearm the Russian military”.25   
The scathing commentary of the Russian defense industry is not limited to 
Russian leaders only, however.  Western experts too have argued that the demise of the 
Russian shipbuilding industry is why the Russian Navy is facing an “irreversible 
collapse” because it can no longer produce warships either in quantity or with the quality 
levels required by the navy, according to Admiral Vysotskiy.26  These individuals simply 
point at the fact that only four new warships have been delivered to the Russian Navy 
between 2000 and 2009.27   
                                                 
22 “Navy C-in-C Vysotskiy Says Russia in Talks to Buy French Warship,” Interfax-AVN, September 
11, 2009. 
23 Sergey Buntman and Anatoliy Yermolin, “Russia: CINC Vysotskiy Interviewed on Ekho Moscow 
Military Council Program,” Ekho Moskvy Online, July 24, 2010. 
24 “Russia Plans to Build Helicopters Carriers in Future,” Interfax-AVN, March 9, 2010. 
25 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Medvedev Scolds Defense Industry and Pledges Huge Spending,” Eurasia 
Daily Monitor 7, no. 171 (September 23, 2010). 
26 “Chapter Four: Russia,” The Military Balance 110, no. 1 (2010), 211. 
27 Mikhail Tsypkin, “The Challenge of Understanding the Russian Navy,” in The Russian Military 
Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald, eds. Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 349. 
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Roman Trotsenko, President of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK) 28 and 
First Deputy Defense Minister Igor Sechin counter that the OSK could build a Mistral 
type warship within the timeframe and the budget required by the Defense Ministry.29  It 
simply needs to be directed to do so.30 
Outside of Russia, there is great disagreement as to what the actual impact of the 
sale is.  The French view point is that the Mistral negotiations are a sign of trust between 
Russia and France.  As the French defense attaché in Russia states, France wants “…to 
turn over the Cold War page.”31  The French Prime Minister, Francois Fillion, has stated 
that “Russia should be treated like a partner” and therefore, it is a signal of trust to engage 
it in potential arms sales.32  Meanwhile the Baltic countries, along with Poland and 
Georgia, are particularly concerned over the sale of military equipment and technology to 
a country that they do not trust.  Lithuanian Member of European Parliament Vytautas 
Landsbergis made the statement that France’s potential sale of warships to Russia was “a 
flower on the grave of Europe’s solidarity”33  Both Lithuania and Latvia have called for 
the EU to approve all arms sales to third party countries.34 
Analysts debate the benefits of the sale.  Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg of the Davis 
Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies does not believe that the sale represents a 
resurgent Russia, but rather that the Mistral will not significantly change the balance of 
                                                 
28 The United Shipbuilding Corporation is a state owned open joint stock company in Russia which 
controls the majority of Russian shipbuilding and repair facilities. The OSK owns multiple large shipyards 
in St Petersburg, Severodvinsk, and Vladivostok.  Some of the major shipyards are Severnoye 
MashinostroiteInoye Predpriyatiye in Severodvinsk, Admiralteyskiye Verfi and Severnaya Verf in St. 
Petersburg, the Yantar Shipyard in Kaliningrad and the Far East Plant Zvezda Shipyard.  These shipyards 
also build the majority of warships and submarines for the Russian Navy.   
29 Dmitriy Belikov, “Russia: Shipbuilding Corp's Trotsenko Interviewed on Expansion, 
Diversification,” Kommersant Online, September 30, 2010. 
30 “Russia: United Shipbuilding Corporation can Build Mistral Helicopter Ship,” ITAR-TASS, 
November 27, 2009. 
31 “France Wants to Turn Over Cold War Page in Relations with Russia,” Interfax-AVN, April 26, 
2010. 
32 “French PM on “Indispensable” Need to Treat Russia as a Partner,” AFP (Domestic Service), 
October 9, 2009. 
33 “Lithuanian MEP Calls Mistral Deal 'a Flower on the Grave of Europe's Solidarity”, Baltic News 
Service, March 4, 2010. 
34 Ibid. 
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power in the Baltic region.  He also thinks it is better to try and cautiously integrate 
Russia into the West (by allowing them to purchase western military equipment) and not 
treat it as a potential enemy.35   
The opposite view is taken by Swedish analyst Bo Pellnas who judges that the 
Russians are building a capability to attack any littoral region in the world with the 
purchase of Mistral style vessels.36  David Smith, a Senior Fellow at the Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, agrees that providing Mistral vessels only rewards Russia for 
its aggression against Georgia and its continued violation of the peace treaty which was 
signed.37  Stephen Blank of the Strategic Studies Institute sees the sale both as a breach in 
NATO solidarity potentially leading to a weakening of Article V defense considerations, 
as well as envisioning that Mistral style ships could be used in the Baltic and Black Sea 
regions to intimidate Russia’s neighbors.38 
Therefore, clear battle lines drawn on multiple, often overlapping, issues 
concerning this sale.  A careful analysis of the facts throughout this thesis will allow the 





                                                 
35 Dmitry Gorenburg, A French Perspective, Russian Military Reform, March 2,2010. 
http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/03/02/a-french-perspective/.  
36 Bo Pellnas, “Russian Power may Split EU,” SvD Online, December 1, 2009. 
37 David J. Smith, “French Ship Sale to Russia must be Blown Off Course,” 24 Saati, November 17, 
2009. http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=15654&Itemid=66.  
38 Stephen Blank, comment on Russian Military Reform (blog), The Mistral Sale: No Reason to 
Panic, February 11, 2010. http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/02/11/the-mistral-sale-no-reason-to-panic/. 
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II. RUSSIAN PLANNING AND REASONS BEHIND THE 
SELECTION OF THE MISTRAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In late 2009, Russia officially opened negotiations with France over the purchase 
of up to four amphibious assault ships of the French Navy’s Mistral class.  As the Soviet 
Navy never had any comparable vessels, and because the Mistral would considerably 
enhance Russia’s strategic reach in the Baltic and Black Seas, the potential acquisition of 
such vessels raised many questions.39  This thesis will argue that the decision to purchase 
four warships from France was not the result of a detailed analysis of Russian naval 
needs.  Rather, the Mistral was desired by Moscow for other reasons.  The benefits of 
gaining new construction knowledge as well as getting new ships rapidly, without 
disrupting existing production, factored heavily into the request.  The selection of a LHD 
vessel seems to indicate that Russia may be looking at multirole platforms, moving away 
from single purpose anti-submarine or anti-surface warships built during the Soviet era.  
Amphibious assault capability was not the driving force behind the selection of an LHD, 
however.  Rather, the Russian Navy is looking to expand capability to carry out various 
“soft power” missions. Russia is not looking for assault capabilities, but technological 
transfer, shipbuilding knowledge, and to expand its peace ops capabilities. At the same 
time, however, the Mistral gives Russia considerable strategic reach in the region which 
has alarmed its neighbors.  
B. RUSSIAN PLANNING DOCUMENTS 
In discussing the proper equipment for the Russian Navy, it is important to look at 
what missions are required of it.  The Russian Government has published a variety of 
policy documents that lay out the official missions and tasks of the Russian Navy, 
beginning with the 2001 Maritime Doctrine, the 2009 Russian National Security Strategy 
                                                 
39 In some literature, the Russian Navy has identified their Mistrals as Project VRS-160 helicopter 
carrying carriers.  But because the warships are better known by the lead vessel’s name, Mistral, this paper 
will refer to the vessels as Mistrals.  Also the western classifications (ex. LST, LHA, etc.) will be used vice 
Russian classifications for ships (ex. UDK, BDK, etc),- Nikolay Khorunzhiy, “Russia: Ministry of Defense 
Will Probably Buy Helicopter Carriers from France,” Vremya Novostey Online, October 21, 2010. 
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(NSS) through 2020, and the 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.  
Unfortunately, these documents spell out neither the true roles which the Russian Navy 
will fulfill, nor capabilities required.  The NSS is particularly vague on defense and does 
not clarify what kind of changes the military needs to make.40  The military doctrine is 
also unhelpful, as there are contradictions between the strategic vision and what is 
currently happening in Russian military reforms.  The military doctrine has been called 
more “a declaration on intent to the west than for use as a guide for internal 
consumption.”41  The Russian armed forces have been undergoing reform since 2008, and 
yet they have so far failed to write new doctrine.  Therefore, the Russian view is “the 
sections of the document [military doctrine] relating to the armed forces are therefore 
nothing more than a useless collection of words of wisdom.” 42  What has come from 
statements about defense reform is that Russia is trying to move toward highly mobile 
forces, which are designed to fight along its periphery rather than designed to fight 
NATO.43  There have also been repeated statements from President Medvedev 
demanding the levels of new armaments in the armed forces should rise from the current 
level of 10 percent to 30 and 70 percent of the inventory in 2015 and 2020 respectively.44  
President Medvedev has also made general statements regarding modernization in 
speeches in 2008 and 2009.  In both speeches he specifically mentions the fact that one 
key element in the Russian defense reform is equipping the Russian military with 
                                                 
40 Sophia Dimitrakopoulou and Andrew Liaropoulos, “Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020: A 
Great Power in the Making?” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 4, no. 1 (winter, 2010), 35. 
41 Olga Bozhyeva, “Antiwar Doctrine. Formally Belligerent Document has in Fact Only Underlined 
Russia's Weakness,” Moskovskiy Komsomolets Online, February 7, 2010. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Mikhail Tsypkin, “What's New in Russia's Military Doctrine?” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 
www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1970150.html (accessed February 27, 2010). 
44 Russian Defense Policy, Defense Ministry Claims More Money Needed for Armaments. 
WordPress.com, June 6, 2010. https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2010/06/04/defense-ministry-
claims-more-money-needed-for-armaments/. 
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modern, sophisticated weapon systems.45  So Russia is moving toward smaller, more 
mobile forces equipped with new weapons. 
C. RUSSIAN STATE ARMAMENTS PROGRAM (GVP) 
The Russian State Armaments program (GVP) is a long–range plan, which over a 
specified time period, will match budget to purchases.  The Russians, however, lack a 
true planning system.  Military planning and the GVP are often based on different 
principles, which lead to strategic confusion.  There is no explicit annual defense budget 
request procedure.  In addition, the GVP is discussed in secrecy.46  For instance, Deputy 
Defense Minister Vera Chistova  announced that “…funds needed to purchase French 
Mistral helicopter carriers…” were added to next year’s (2011) draft defense budget, a 
sure indication that little forethought was given to the decision.47  The fact that she 
mentioned both the country and the winning ship before the official winner of the 
tender48 was announced by General Nikolai Makarov49 or President Medvedev speaks 
volumes for the lack of a planning process, or a true assessment of naval needs and ways 
to acquire the desired capability.  General Makarov announced on 14 December that a 
decision had been reached on purchasing a Mistral helicopter carrier from France,50 
which was no surprise as many felt the entire tender was for show and the result was 
likely predetermined.  The fact that General Makarov made his announcement before 
                                                 
45 In the 2008 speech, President Medvedev said “…of course we need an army which is equipped with 
sophisticated weapons…Fundamentally new, high technology weapons will play a particular role.” – 
Dmitry Medvedev, “Opening Address at a Meeting with Commanders of Military Districts,” President of 
Russia, Official Web Portal, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/09/26/2019_type82912type84779_206970.shtml 
(accessed April 23, 2011).  In 2009 President Medvedev stated “The third and most important challenge is 
to equip our troops with advanced weapons...In 2011 we will begin the large-scale rearmament of the army 
and navy.” – Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at an Extended Session of the Defence Ministry Board,” 
President of Russia, Official Web Portal, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2009/03/17/2037_type82913type84779_214073.shtml 
(accessed April 23, 2011). 
46 Vasily Zatsepin, “Performance-Oriented Defence Budgeting: A Russian Perspective,” Gaidar 
Institute for Economic Policy, 2005. www.iet.ru/files/persona/zatsepin/Brno2005.pdf. 
47 “Russian Draft Budget Earmarks Money for Mistral Deal,” Interfax, October 26, 2010. 
48 A tender was offered by Russia at the 2010 Euro-Naval convention for bids to build with Russia 
four amphibious assault ships.   
49 General of the Army Nikolai Makarov is the current Chief of the Russian General Staff. 
50 “Purchase of Mistral Helicopter Carriers from France Approved,” ITAR-TASS, December 14, 2010. 
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President Medvedev telephoned French President Sarkozy on 24 December 2010; 
officially announcing that France had won the warship tender,51 only furthers this 
suspicion.   
There have been three prior GVP before the current one: GVP 1996–2005, GVP 
2001–2010, and GVP 2007–2015.  The only thing they have in common is that in each 
case the government failed to achieve its stated goals, in part perhaps because each was 
revised soon after its creation.  These overlaps make it difficult to see what was actually 
bought or where money was spent.52  Of note, the 2007–2015 GVP made no mention of 
an amphibious assault warship, or a helicopter carrier.  So the desire to acquire the 
Mistral seems to have been an impulse buy.  The 2007–2015 GVP was changed in 
midstream when Defense Minister Serdyukov initiated a reform of the Russian forces in 
the aftermath of the 2008 Georgian conflict.  So the plans and concepts laid out in the 
GVP were quickly overtaken by events.53 , Serdyukov announced that the importation of 
two Mistral class warships were included in GPV 2011-2020.  However, investments in 
the construction of similar ships in Russia are not included in the GPV.54  Apparently, 
then, the stated goals of upgrading and modernizing the Russian shipbuilding industry 
were an afterthought.  Moscow-based defense specialist Konstantin Makiyenko55  
believes that construction of the domestically produced warships will be decided after the 
first warship is built and tested.56   
The French Mistral was laid down in July 2003, launched in October 2004, and 
commissioned in December 2006.  The second vessel, the Tonnerre, took four years from 
the keel being laid to commissioning.  So, with a three-year lay to launch window, the 
United Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK) schedule to begin construction of a domestically 
                                                 
51 “France Wins Tender to Build Warships for Russia,” RIA Novosti, December 24, 2010. 
52 Russian Defense Policy, “More Popovkin on GPV 2011-2020.” July 20, 2010. 
http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2010/07/20/more-popovkin-on-gpv-2011-2020/. 
53 Ruslan Pukhov, “A Strange Undertaking,” Izvestiya, November 25, 2009. 
54 “French Mistral Favorite in Russian Helicopter Ship Tender,” Interfax-AVN, October 28, 2010. 
55 Konstantin Makiyenko is an expert of the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies 
(CAST), a Moscow based, private think tank specializing in Russian military affairs. 
56 Aleksey Nikolskiy and Maksim Tovkaylo, “Russia to Sign Contract for Purchase of Mistral-Type 
Ship in First Half of 2011,” Vedomosti Online, January 25, 2011. 
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produced Mistral by 2014 seems wildly optimistic.57  Russian Defense Ministry sources 
have said they expect the first Mistral to be delivered in “late 2013-early 2014 and the 
second in late 2014-early 2015.”58 This is on par with the French built Mistrals building 
timelines.  However, to imagine that the Russian Mistrals could be built faster than the 
French ones, especially since the Russian Mistrals will require some design 
modifications, is anchored more in fantasy than realistic assessment.  The longer it takes 
the French to build the warships means more employment for French workers.  So there 
seems to be little time for testing of the first warship.  More realistically, if the OSK is to 
begin building warships by 2014, the GVP will have to be changed this year.  The other 
potential outcome is that the Russian Navy waits, and accepts the fact that it will initially 
have minimal upgrades to its domestic shipyards, so that the third and fourth ship will be 
delivered after 2020.  High placed sources in the Russian Navy’s main headquarter have 
indicated that the GVP will only include funds to purchase two French built Mistrals, and 
the Russian built Mistrals are not envisioned until after 2020.59 
Ruslan Pukhov states that the Mistral sale represents all that is wrong in the 
Ministry of Defense as well as with the service chiefs in terms of a lack of clear cut views 
on long range prospects in the area of military technology planning.  The inference from 
the latest GPV is that Russian planning remains subject to stop and starts, instability, and 
displays of volyuntarizm.60 Volyuntarizm is a term Russians use to mean behavior subject 
to ill-considered changes, or changes made by people without consulting the experts.  
This is exactly the criticism of the Mistral sale, that plans keep getting changed and 
people who do not know better are the ones making the changes and choices.   
D. WHAT STARTED THE TREND TOWARD MISTRAL? 
In August 2009 when the Russians formally approached the French, inquiring 
about the purchase of multiple Mistral class warships, genuine surprise arose from the 
                                                 
57 Yelena Danilevich and L. Paleyeva, “Mistral from Kronshtad,” Argumenty i Fakty Online, January 
26, 2011. 
58 “Russia, France Sign Warship Agreement,” RIA-Novosti, 2011. 
59 “Russia Will Not Build Mistral Helicopter Carriers before 2020,” Interfax, February 9, 2011. 
60 Pukhov, A Strange Undertaking. Izvestiya, November 25, 2009. 
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Russian defense industry and analysts.  Immediately it was noted that there was no 
mention of a LHD style amphibious assault warship in the 2007–2015 GPV.  The only 
amphibious warship that had been discussed in previous years was the Ivan Gren LST.  
This vessel was projected as a direct replacement for the Alligator class LST.  The Ivan 
Gren is also considered a follow on improvement to the Alligator, as indicated by the 
Project number.  The Alligators were classified as Project 1174 while the Ivan Grens are 
classified as Project 1174.1.  The lead vessel had been laid down in 2004 and was 
expected in service in 2009, yet had disappeared from defense discussions and even the 
builder’s website for a period of time.61  It would be fair to say the idea of amphibious 
assault ships in general for the Russian Navy seemed to be on the back burner.   
This thesis makes clear that there are a multitude of factors driving this sale.  It 
also argues that an in depth analysis of Russian Navy mission requirements is not one of 
them.  
1. Russian Defense Industry 
First, the Russian Armed Forces, and particularly the Navy, are tired of waiting 
for products from the Russian defense industry.  The Russian Navy’s newest nuclear 
attack submarine, the Severodvinsk SSN (Project 885), was under construction for 17 
years at Sevmash in Severodvinsk before being delivered.62  The Russian Army just 
canceled procurement of the T-95 MBT because it had been in development since the 
early 1990s and became obsolete before it would have been fielded.63  The navy was also 
scheduled to receive its initial frigate of the Admiral Gorshkov class in 2009, with 20 in 
service by 2015.  Instead, the first frigate will be ready in 2011; leaving considerable 
doubt the navy will have more than three or four by 2015.64  Funding is no longer the 
                                                 
61 Dmitry Gorenburg, The Mistral Comes to Town, Russian Military Reform, November 25, 2009.  
http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2009/11/25/the-mistral-comes-to-town/.  
62 Mikhail Barabanov, “Russian Shipyards Review: Most Unable to Build Modern Ships, Need 
Modernization,” Kommersant Online, October 25, 2010. 
63 Christopher F. Foss, “Russian Army Abandons Development of T-95 MBT,” Jane's Defence 
Weekly, http://jmsa.janes.comlibproxy.nps.edu (accessed September 10, 2010). 
64 Dmitry Gorenburg, The Future of the Russian Navy Part 2: Smaller Surface Ships, Russian Military 
Reform, August 29, 2010. https://russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/08/29/the-future-of-the-russian-navy-part-
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issue as it was during the 1990s when there were no domestic orders.  Although shipyards 
are now receiving defense money, projects lag behind schedule.  This realization that 
nothing was going to change may have spurred the Navy to look to foreign shipyards.  
Deputy Director for Moscow’s Institute for Political and Defense Analysis Aleksandr 
Franchikhin believes that the sale would pressure the Russian VPK (defense industrial 
complex) to produce better quality products, although he doubts the Mistral should be the 
tool of choice for this pressure.65  However ,the Mistral serves multiple needs.  First, it 
signals to the VPK that the Russian military is no longer limited by domestic production 
capabilities and in general is displeased with the quality and timeliness of equipment 
procurement.  Second, the Mistral (specifically the technology transfer) gives the Russian 
Navy the potential to construct future warships in a more modern and faster way.  
Finally, the purchase of four Mistrals upgrades the Russian fleet faster than waiting for 
domestically produced warships.    
According to a 2009 report by the Independent Military Review, the Russian Navy 
faces collapse because the domestic shipbuilding industry can build neither the quantity 
nor quality of ships the navy needs.  Within ten years, the report says, there will be less 
than fifty warships in the entire Russian Navy capable of operations.66  With this dire 
prognosis, the navy does not need ships fifteen or twenty years from now – it needs ships 
now!  The Russian Navy hopes that by buying abroad it can have warships enter service 
faster.  This urgency to acquire new ships can be seen in other pursuits besides simply the 
Mistral.  The Russian Navy has announced plans to complete the refurbishment of the 
Admiral Nakhimov, one of its three remaining Kirov class nuclear powered battle 
cruisers.67  In addition, Russia is in talks with Ukraine about the possible procurement of 
a Slava class missile cruiser which has been sitting unfinished in Nikolayev, Ukraine for 
20 years.68  Ukraine says the ship is 95% complete, while Russia views it closer to 50%.  
                                                 
65 Aleksandr Bushev and Sergy Ilchenko, “Who is the Real Master of the Black Sea Fleet,” 
Svobodnaya Pressa, February 26, 2010. 
66 Reuben F. Johnson, “The Fleet that has to Die the Russian Navy's Irreversible Collapse,” The 
Weekly Standard (July 15, 2009). 
67 RIA Novosti, “Russia Plans to Upgrade 3 Nuclear-Powered Cruisers by 2020 (Update 1).” 
68 “Russia Waits for Kiev's Acceptable Decision on the Missile Cruiser Sale,” RIA Novosti, 
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Still Moscow estimates that it would take 1.7 billion rubles (60 million dollars) to bring it 
back into service.69  Refurbishing older warships may still be faster (and cheaper) than 
waiting for a new warship to be constructed, especially since no new construction of 
missile cruisers is planned – above all no nuclear powered cruisers. The acquisitions of 
the Mistral fit as part of the Russian plan to rebuild their fleet quickly, with pure numbers 
trumping a true methodical modernization and refurbishment plan. 
When it became public knowledge that the Russian Navy was interested in 
purchasing a series of amphibious assault ships, the OSK insisted that it could build a 
Mistral style warship to the same specifications, if not better, than the French version.70 
Claims arose from the Russian defense industry that they had both the capability and 
knowledge to build a modern helicopter carrier.  They pointed to the Nevskoye Design 
Bureau’s design Project 11780 UDK, which was an LHA designed during the Soviet era 
with a displacement of 30,000-40,000 tons displacement.  This design was even larger 
than the Mistral and, they claimed, more capable. 
 
Figure 5.   Line drawing of Project 1178071 
                                                 
69 Russian Defense Policy, Russia is Not Likely to Buy Ukraina. WorldPress.com, March 30, 2011. 
http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/03/30/russia-not-likely-to-buy-ukraina/. 
70 ITAR-TASS, “Russia: United Shipbuilding Corporation can Build Mistral Helicopter Ship.” 
71 Aleksandr Mozgovoi, “Turns of the Plotline. Projects by Russian Design Bureaus are Not Inferior 
to Foreign Ones,” Natsionalnaya Oborona Online, May 31, 2010. 
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The Project 11780 was designed to carry out the same functions as the U.S. 
Tarawa class LHA.  The Soviet design was referred to as the “Ivan Tarava” because of 
its similarities in mission and design to the American LHA.72  A lack of available 
building berths in the late 1980s was one of the reasons that construction on the class was 
never started, along with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.73 
 
Figure 6.   Model of the UDC Project 11780 (From strizhi.ru74) 
The design knowledge probably still exists in Russia.  The problem is that 
updating a design from the 1980s would take time and would require modifications.  
Most importantly, the experience in building a modern helicopter carrier is missing in 
Russia today. 
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2. Outdated Shipbuilding Facilities 
At present, Russia could not replicate a French-built Mistral.  The Mistral was 
built jointly by Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN) and Chantiers de l'Atlantique 
with construction taking place in shipyards in both Saint-Nazaire and Brest.  The Mistral 
and her sister ships are built in a modular fashion.  For the Mistral and the Tonnerre, the 
front portions of the ships were constructed in Saint-Nazaire before being transported to 
Brest for mating with the aft portion of the ship. 
 
Figure 7.   Mating of the forward and aft sections of the Mistral (From Yannick Le Bris, 
2004) 
This modular construction requires the use of extremely heavy cranes to lift 
several hundred-ton modules into place.  For example, the Saint-Nazaire shipyard has a 
gantry crane that can lift 750-ton sections.75  Mistral assembly also required a graving 
dock, as the front and back halves were floated together (as seen in Figure 7). 
                                                 




Figure 8.   Example of the modular construction of the Mistral BPCs.  This is the 690 ton 
forward module being assembled for the third French BPC, the Dixmude. (From 
Bernard Biger, STX France, 2009)76 
In contrast, Soviet era and Russian shipyards do not use modular techniques in 
building large warships.  Rather warships were assembled piece by piece from the keel 
up.  Another important consideration is that all the aviation ships were built for the Soviet 
Navy in the Nikolayev shipyard, which is in Ukraine.77  In Table 1, the capabilities of the 
largest shipyards in Russia are presented for comparison: 
                                                 
76 “Saint-Nazaire: Le BPC Dixmude Reçoit Son Étrave Et Ses Moteurs,” Meret Marine, 
http://www.meretmarine.com/article.cfm?id=113043. 
77 The Nikolayev shipyard built the Moskva class helicopter carrier, Kiev class VSTOL carrier, the 
Kuznetsov carrier and had begun construction on the Soviet’s full size nuclear aircraft carrier, the 
Ulyanovsk before it was cancelled because of the USSR’s break up.   
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Table 1.   Major Russian Shipyard Capabilities78 
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The Mistral’s length is 199 meters by 32 meters wide, and empty she weighs 17,000 tons 
 
In looking at the shipyard capabilities, only the physical capabilities and sizes will 
be considered.  The ability of the shipyards to produce the necessary components is 
outside the scope of this examination.  Of all the major Russian shipyards, only Sevmash 
comes close to having the physical capability to build the Mistral in a modular fashion.  
The problem is some of the largest sections of the Mistral weigh upwards of 690 tons 
(see Figure 8), exceeding current Russian shipyard crane capability.  Russian shipyard 
crane capacity as a whole lags behind modern shipyard construction cranes throughout 
the world.79  Either the Mistral’s modular construction design would have to be modified 
for Sevmash’s smaller cranes, or Sevmash itself would need new cranes.  Neither option 
is ideal, because the Russians want to learn the French shipbuilding techniques, the most  
 
 
                                                 
78 All data on Russian shipyard characteristics was obtained from the shipyards official websites: 
Sevmash at www.sevmash.ru / Baltiysky Zavod at www.bz.ru / Admiralty Shipyard at www.admship.ru / 
Far East Plant Zvezda at www.fez-zvezda.ru / Severnaya Shipbuilding Plant at www.nordsy.spb.ru / Yantar 
Shipyard at www.shipyard-yantar.ru /  Amur Shipbuilding Plant at www.amurshipyard.ru.   
79 As examples, the Northrop Grumman Corporation Newport News shipyard which builds the Nimitz 
and Ford class nuclear aircraft carriers has a 900 ton capacity crane, soon to be upgraded to an 1100 ton 
crane.  The Navantia Fene-Ferrol Shipyard in Spain which builds the Juan Carlos LHD has a 800 ton 
capacity crane for assembly of modular portions of ships.  “Northrop Grumman Corporation Newport 
News,” Jane's Naval Construction and Retrofit Markets, http://jdim.janes.com/JDIC/JDIM/home.do, 
“Instalaciones: Astillero Fene-Ferrol,” Navantia, 
http://www.navantia.es/irj/portal/anonymous/AstFeneFerrol?guest_user=anonymous_en. 
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effective and modern ones, not a compromise between advanced techniques and current 
capability of Russian yards.  Waiting and delaying current orders to upgrade the shipyard 
is also less than ideal. 
Sevmash does have experience with modular construction techniques. However it 
has primarily only built submarines, with its surface warship production ending in the late 
1950s.  It has more recently struggled with retrofitting the ex-Admiral Gorshkov aircraft 
carrier on schedule for the Indian Navy.  In addition to its retrofit struggles, Sevmash has 
fallen behind on deadlines in construction the Prirazlomnaya oil platform for Gazprom, 
which was also built in a modular fashion.80  Besides the crane issue, perhaps a more 
pressing reason that Russia looked away from Sevmash to build a Mistral is that, as the 
sole current producer of nuclear submarines for the Russian Navy, Sevmash is operating 
close to capacity.  After launching the Yuriy Dolgorukiy/Borei SSBN (Project 955) in 
2008, and the second ship of its class, the Alexander Nevsky, Sevmash still has two more 
Borei SSBN class under construction.81  In addition to the Borei class, Sevmash just 
launched the lead vessel of the Severodvinsk class SSN (Project 855) and has a second 
Severodvinsk SSN under construction currently.  Sevmash Director General Nikolaj 
Yakovlevich Kalistratov has stated that with the announced submarine building program, 
his yard will be operating at capacity until 2020.82  
The Russian Navy needs both new surface ships and submarines.  As the Sevmash 
shipyard is the primary producer of submarines for the Russian Navy, any massive 
shipyard upgrades for surface ship construction would impact the building of submarines. 
To delay submarine production in order to build a Mistral is not in the overall interest of 
the Russian Navy. Therefore, if the Mistral-class LHD is built in Russia, it probably will 
not be in Sevmash. 
                                                 
80 Barabanov, Russian Shipyards Review: Most Unable to Build Modern Ships, Need Modernization, 
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81 “Putin Congratulates New Submarine Crew on Start of Dockside Trials,” ITAR-TASS, December 
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Unfortunately for Moscow, none of the other shipyards in Russia are capable of 
building a Mistral in a modular fashion.  While the shipbuilding berths at the Baltiysky 
Zavod and Admiralty shipyards could handle a Mistral, they rely on keel up, piece by 
piece construction.  The completed warship slides down a ramp into the water.  This is an 
older, time-consuming method of shipbuilding.  Neither shipyard has the crane capacity 
to support lifting and placing large modules in place.  The Russian Navy seeks the 
capability to build a modular warship.  The OSK wants the ability to build modular ships 
in the future, whether for civilian or military purposes.  All of the Soviet era large 
warships, such as the Kirov, Kiev, and Kuznetsov classes, were all built piece by piece 
from the keel up.  So a Mistral would not only be the first modular constructed warship in 
the Russian/Soviet Navy.  It would also be the first warship with a podded propulsion 
system.83 Clearly, it would be more efficient and quicker to have the French provide the 
necessary modular construction knowledge than for the Russians to figure it out 
themselves by trial and error. 
Also, as with Sevmash, Russian shipbuilders have done a decent job in the last 
five years of utilizing all available building facilities.  The Admiralty shipyard has 
launched for the Russian Navy the Lada or Sankt-Peterbrug SS (Project 677) diesel 
submarine, and is building two more of the Lada class as well.84  Besides domestic Lada 
orders, Admiralty also just finished two Project 636M (Improved SS Kilo class) 
submarines for Algeria, has orders from Vietnam for six more 636M, potential sales to 
Venezuela and Indonesia and has received orders from the Russian Navy for three 
636M.85       
The Yantar shipyard is also backlogged with orders after nearly 20 years of not 
launching a new warship.  Currently Yantar has orders to build three Project 121356M 
                                                 
83 The podded propulsion system, or azipod system, with pictures is explained later when discussing 
the Mistral’s capabilities. 
84 Barabanov, Russian Shipyards Review: Most Unable to Build Modern Ships, Need Modernization. 
85 Ibid. 
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frigates, three frigates of the Project 11356M (Talwar Class) class for the Black Sea Fleet 
and six Ivan Gren Project 11711 LST, two of which are currently under construction.86   
The Severnaya Verf shipyard by some accounts has one of the highest workloads 
in the shipbuilding industry today.87  It is currently building two Admiral Gorshkov 
(Project 22350) frigates, an intelligence vessel of the Project 18280 class, and  two 
Stergushchiy (Project 20380) corvettes.   
This workload at the Admiralty, Yantar, and Severnya Verf shipyards is 
significant.  These shipyards do not have the capacity to modernize significantly their 
facilities to construct a Mistral, all the while maintaining production of their current 
orders.  In order to modernize, existing production would have to be curtailed.  Again, 
this is opposite of the overall goal of the Russian Navy, which is to get as many ships as 
possible into the fleet quickly to replace aging warships.  For the shipyards as well, the 
foreign orders are providing vital capital, so delaying foreign orders is counterproductive 
to the shipyards themselves.   
The Amur shipyard, which concentrated on submarine construction, was never a 
major surface warship shipyard for the Soviet Navy.  Today however, it has no orders 
from the Russian Navy after it completed the Project 971I SSN submarine.  It is also in 
dire need of modernization.88 
The Baltiysky Zavod shipyard last finished a ship building order in 2004 and does 
not have any pending orders.  This shipyard needs modernization, but upgrading the 
facility does not fit into the long term plans of St Petersburg.  The city hopes to free up 
considerable space for “infrastructure expansion and housing construction.”89  Both the 
Admiralty and Baltiysky Zavod shipyards occupy real estate on the waterfront of 
downtown St Petersburg.  Neither has the expansion room that modernization would 
require.  Nor is the Baltiysky Zavod shipyard yet a part of the OSK as of May 2010.  
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89 Danilevich and Paleyeva, Mistral from Kronshtad. 
 30
Since the Mistral contract was awarded to a consortium of DCNS and OSK, construction 
at Baltiysky can be ruled out, not the least because it is also in serious financial trouble, 
with the bank that controls it, Mezhprombank having just had its baking license revoked 
for debts.90    
The construction of the Russian Mistrals is to take place at a new facility being 
constructed at the Kronshtadt Naval Shipyard, on Kotlin Island, at the mouth of Neva 
Bay in St Petersburg.  This new facility, which will become the main Admiralty Shipyard 
location, is viewed as a facility to not only build Mistrals, but also capable of building 
other modern civilian and military ships in future.91  The Kronshtadt Naval Shipyard had 
been one of the major repair facilities for the Baltic Fleet.  As such, it already has 
sizeable graving docks (with one large enough for a Mistral), which just need to be 
refurbished and modernized with new buildings and cranes.  This would allow the 
construction to continue uninterrupted at other Russian shipyards.  This may allow the 
Russian Navy to acquire more warships faster.  But, the bottom line is that while it could 
be theoretically possible to build a Mistral in a current Russian shipyard via old building 
methods, no shipyard can build a Mistral in the French manner.   
3. Further Arguments Against Domestic Design and Production Only 
General Makarov admitted that if Russia were to design a LHA/LHD, it would 
have taken “at least 10 years to develop a ship similar to the Mistral.”92  He goes on to 
point that in the time it would take Russian design bureaus to either redesign a Project 
11780 UDK or come up with a new design, newer, more modern designs would be 
developed by western nations.93  This would mean that not only would the Russian Navy 
not get a warship inside of five years, but also probably get an outdated design in 2020.  
By contrast, a French-built Mistral could be in service as soon as 2014. 94  There may 
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have also been fears in trying to redesign a vessel, as evidenced by the issues Sevmash 
has had in redesigning the ex-Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier for the Indian navy.  The 
Gorshkov was scheduled to be finished in 2008, however current reports indicate it may 
only be accepted by the Indian Navy sometime in 2012.95 
Soon after news of the Russian Navy’s interest in a Mistral-class vessel surfaced, 
the OSK indirectly admitted it did not have the necessary building ability by first 
proposing to form a joint venture with the South Korean firm of Daewoo Shipbuilding & 
Marine Engineering.  The OSK proposed that Russia purchase from this joint venture the 
South Korean Dokdo LPH, which the OSK said could be built in three years.  The 
Russian Ministry of Defense told the OSK that “talk is cheap,”96 and rejected the idea. 
The OSK then signed an agreement with DCNS forming a shipbuilding consortium to bid 
on the Mistral, as well as agreed to build future civilian and military vessels.97  This 
consortium also would include full technology transfers between DCNS and OSK.  The 
fact that there was far less criticism of this consortium than the South Korean one again 
indicates that the French Mistral was the primary focus of Russia, not simply the most 
capable ship. 
The willingness of OSK to form consortiums with foreign companies may be an 
admission that the OSK cannot realistically produce a new LHD/LHA from design to 
launch completely on its own.  By teaming with foreign companies, the OSK will not 
only stay involved with the actual construction, but also stands to gain knowledge of 
more modern shipbuilding techniques. 
4. Tirpitz Plan Redux 
The Russian Navy’s Commander in Chief, Admiral Vysotskiy, thought to be the 
Navy’s chief proponent of the Mistral, is believed to have started the push after first 
seeing one in 2008.98  This suggests that a desire to acquire a new system preceded 
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identifying a required capability and developing a system to fulfill that capability.  It 
recalls the Tirpitz Plan—German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s push in 1898 to acquire a 
large battle fleet without any strategic rationale beyond the fact that fleets were seen as a 
symbol of national prestige. British First Lord Winston Churchill denounced Germany’s 
“luxury fleet” as an aggressive attack on Britain’s national security. This began a naval 
arms race that eventually terminated at the Battle of Jutland in 1916. Admiral Vysotskiy 
probably saw the Mistral as a way to elevate the navy’s profile within the country and 
Russia’s defense establishment with a large capital warship, as well as proclaim the 
navy’s dissatisfaction with the products it got from Russian shipyards.  In July 2010, 
Admiral Vysotskiy participated in an interview on the Ekho Moskvy Military Council 
broadcast.  In it he commented that as the Russian forces were moving away from a 
mobilization based system to one based on permanent units and forces, those new forces 
needed the ability to redeploy rapidly.99  The Mistral would definitely be able to aid in 
this manner.  Vysotskiy made another comment, where he said that the French correctly 
call a Mistral a “force projection and command ship”, and indicated that Russia would 
treat its Mistral’s the same way.100  While the emphasis on the command and control will 
be supported elsewhere, this statement is one of the few places where any mention of 
projecting power is made.  The direct amphibious assault capability was not mentioned 
by Vysotskiy, an important point indicating again how that capability is likely not the 
driving reason behind the selection of the Mistral. 
Regardless of the reasons, it shows the purchase was a top down type decision, 
unsupported with an analysis of current Russian naval needs, or its impact on the 
strategic environment.  The decision seems to have been driven at the highest levels of 
government, encouraged by French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s desire to create orders 
for French companies business and jobs for French workers.101   When the agreement was 
signed on 25 January 2011, the French Defense Minister stated that the agreement would 
provide 6.2 million hours of work and secure 1,200 French jobs for four years for STX 
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and DCNS.102  The large number of jobs secured by the deal demonstrates why the 
French have gone to such lengths to accommodate Russian requests for technology and 
have been willing to negotiate on the price. 
5. Lessons Learned From Georgia Conflict 
The five-day war against Georgia in August of 2008 convinced some that Mistral 
warships in Russia’s naval inventory could have filled important capability gaps.  
Admiral Vysotskiy famously commented that the Mistral would have reduced the time 
needed to for Russia to conquer Georgia from a day to forty minutes.103  But his 
reasoning seems flawed.  A Mistral’s maximum speed is 19 knots, while the Ropouchas 
and Alligators in service at the time had a maximum speed of 16-18 knots.  Therefore, a 
Mistral would have not transported troops from Sevastopol and Novorossiisk much faster 
to Georgia than the Ropucha LSTs that were actually used to transport troops.104  The 
only place the Mistral could have made a difference was in offloading troops, depending 
on how they were loaded as well as where they were needed.   
The Russians did land troops using Ropucha class LSTs during the conflict.  The 
original plan was to sail into the port of Ochamchira. However, the LST’s draft was too 
deep for the shallow channel into the harbor so they had to offload onto the beach.105  The 
beach was fortunately (for the Russians) undefended and suitable for landing operations.  
A Mistral could have quickly moved troops ashore to various locations via helicopters, 
negating the risk of LSTs beaching themselves. 
Perhaps one of the most important lessons learned was in regard to close air 
support, especially by attack helicopters.  Due to the high elevation of the Caucasus 
mountain range and the summer conditions, helicopters could not cross from Russia over 
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to Georgia fully loaded and armed, so there was no attack helicopter close air support for 
the first few days of the conflict.  Ground troops had to wait until a temporary air base 
was set up in South Ossetia before they could rely on attack helicopters for close air 
support.106  It has been proposed that the Russian Mistrals will have some combination of 
Kamov helicopters on it.107  One of the proposed helicopters is the extremely capable 
attack helicopter, the Ka-52 Alligator (HOKUM B), which has a combat range of 
450km.108  From the Georgian coast to Tbilisi is roughly 280 km.  Therefore, having up 
to 16 Ka-52s sitting off the Georgian coast could have theoretically provided close air 
support to most of the western parts of Georgia.  The assault transport Ka-29TB (HELIX 
B), has only about a 100km range109, one however that would still allow for the rapid 
deployment and redeployment of troops deep inside Georgian territory.  Helicopters 
would also be very useful in controlling littoral areas.  An area as crowded with shipping 
as the Black Sea is not a place that is conducive to long–range surface to surface missiles; 
attack helicopters most likely would be better suited for the interdiction and possible 
destruction of unknown vessels.  Kamov has also developed a specific maritime version 
of its Ka-52 helicopter, the Ka-52MD.  This maritime attack helicopter version will have 
specific maritime navigation and deck landing equipment, as well as the potential to 
employ the Kh-35 Uran air to surface missile (AS-20 KAYAK).110  A dedicated maritime 
attack helicopter increases the Mistral’s combat striking power, especially in littoral 
areas. 
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Another lesson learned was that Russian troops suffered from poor inter-service 
coordination, and poor command and control on both the operational and tactical 
levels.111  The Mistral’s 800 square meters of command space could have been useful for 
the theatre commander.  From a command ship off the coast, the theatre commander 
would have theoretically been able to control the entire battlefield, along with a full staff 
of up to 150 people.  However, the rest of the armed forces need first to be equipped with 
the proper systems to communicate back to the Mistral.  Furthermore, the command, 
control and communications needed for joint operations do not yet exist in the Russian 
forces.112  So while a Mistral could be useful, it is not the missing link in Russian 
command and control – the entire system needs significant basic development first. 
Besides the defense industry’s failings, pressure from the top and Georgian 
lessons learned, there are two other reasons potentially pushing Russia toward a 
helicopter carrier, specifically the Mistral.  Kamov is the main producer of naval 
helicopters for Russia, and also builds attack helicopters.  Russia’s other major helicopter 
manufacturer, Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, has traditionally not designed helicopters 
for prolonged shipboard use.  Furthermore, in 2006, control of both Kamov and Mil 
passed to Russian Helicopters, a holding of the Oboronprom Corporation.  Much like the 
United Shipbuilding Corporation, Russian Helicopters oversees all domestic helicopter 
production. 
If Russia purchases up to four helicopter carriers, each capable of carrying 16 
helicopters, those helicopters have to come from somewhere.  The Russian Navy is 
severely lacking naval assault helicopters, with only 28 Ka-29TB spread among the four 
fleets, and would need to buy new ones or refurbish existing models to equip its 
Mistrals.113  This would provide a large contract to a domestic supplier and keep them 
well supplied with work.  In July 2010 it was reported that Kamov may get a contract for 
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at least 100 Ka-27 and Ka-52 if the Mistrals were bought.114  The Ka-52 is already in 
production at Kamov Arseniev Plant in eastern Russia.  Because the last Ka-29 was 
produced in 1993, the assembly line has long been closed.  Instead of new construction, 
one report indicates that Kamov may attempt to modernize the remaining 28 (out of 59 
built for USSR/Russia) with modern avionics and glass cockpits.115  The requirement for 
a modern troop transport could also lend itself to the further development and acquisition 
of Kamov Ka-60 Killer Whale series of transport helicopters, which are currently 
undergoing testing (yet without firm orders).  Besides attack and transport helicopters, 
other helicopters would also need to be purchased.  Dedicated search and rescue (SAR) 
missions could require more Ka-27PS (HELIX D) orders, the dedicated SAR version as 
there are only 22 in service116.  Early warning versions of the HELIX, the Ka-31 could 
also be purchased to give the Russian Mistrals an airborne early warning radar platform.  
Lastly the Ka-226 (HOODLUM) could also be used for utility missions.  As these are 
only a few examples, the point is the Russian Navy does not currently own enough 
helicopters to outfit fully all four of their Mistrals to execute missions, while servicing 
the rest of their fleet.  As Kamov is the primary producer of naval helicopters, it stands to 
reason that the Mistral contract will directly benefit Kamov as well.  
The final point may be small, but still important.  Russia has made it very clear 
that it wishes to acquire both the technologies and the licenses to produce domestically 
the equipment for the Mistral.  Deputy Minister Popovkin has stated  
Unlike some other countries, we are not engaged in clandestine copying of 
models; we openly say that we are prepared to pay for these technologies; 
we are prepared to buy licenses for the production of advanced 
hardware.117  
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115 Butowski and Bombeau, Moscow Commits to the 'Mistral,' 38–39. 
116 Chapter Five: Russia, 187. 
117 “Russia Wants to Buy Defence Technology, Not Copy it Secretly - Official,” RIA-Novosti, 
October 26, 2010. 
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This could be seen as a rebuke of the Chinese, especially since China has recently 
offered its clones of Russian fighter jets for sale.118  This may indicate that Russia is 
trying to claim the high ground in world arm sales by demonstrating respect for 
international laws.  It also works in Russia’s favor if it wishes to purchase future arms 
from western nations.  If it demonstrates that it is following international licensing 
agreements and copyrights, western nations would be more likely to sell again to Russia.  
Again, this is a very small point, but conceivably significant because Russia keeps 
bringing this point up.  Perhaps this sale is Russia’s method to show by example to China 
how foreign arms sales ought to be conducted. 
E. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS 
While examining the potential reasons for the Russian interest in the Mistral, it is 
helpful to also look at what the Russian Navy currently possesses.  According to the 2010 
Military Balance, the Russian Navy has one LPD (Landing Platform Dock) as its 
foremost amphibious ship as well as 22 medium landing ships (LS) and tank landing 
ships (LST).  The 2011 Military Balance no longer lists the Ivan Rogov LPD in active 
service and has counted a few amphibious transports that are in reserve for a total number 
of 25.  The LPD is kept in the table for comparative purposes, but again the availability 
of the sole remaining Ivan Rogov is highly doubtful.  The Russian Navy also has thirteen 
other landing craft, ranging from medium and light through a variety of air-cushioned 
vehicles designed to bring troops and equipment ashore.  Table 2 summarizes the 
capabilities and sizes of the main Russian amphibious capability.  It also includes the 
Mistral’s capabilities as a point of comparison.  Figure 9 shows the side profiles of each 
ship in comparative scale, giving a size comparison between the various warships. 
                                                 
118 Jeremy Page, “China Clones, Sells Russian Fighter Jets,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2010. 
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Figure 9.   From top to bottom: Mistral, Ivan Gren, Ivan Rogov, Ropucha, Alligator, 
Polnocny to scale (from John Pike at Global Security.org, and Mistral from Y.Le 
Bris at shipshape.fr) 
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IOC 1967 1964 1975 1976 
Scheduled 
for 2012 2014 
# in service 1-6 4 15 0 likely 1 building 4 planned 
Length 
(meters) 75  113  112  157 128 200 
Displacement 





Range (nm) 1,000  8,000  6,000  7,500  3,500  11,000 
Max Speed 
(kts) 19 18 17.5 19 18 19 
Military 
Troop Lift 180 300 190 522 300  450-900
Military 
Vehicle Lift 6 MBT 20 MBT 
10 MBT or  
24 APC 
up to 53 
MBT or  
80 APC 






Crew Size 42 55 95 239 100 188 
Helicopters none none none 4 Ka-29 1 Ka-29 16 Ka-29/52 
Landing 









It is evident that the Russian Navy retains the ability to move troops and 
equipment from the sea to the shore.  The Ropucha class LSTs supplies the backbone of 
the Russian amphibious fleet, with a decent capability to carry troops and their 
equipment.  Perhaps the most glaring weakness is a lack of aviation capability or an 
ability to offload troops and equipment without having to beach the landing ship, 
assuming there is one suitable for beach capable LSTs.  The only other option is to pull 
                                                 
119 All capability data is from Jane’s Fighting Ships (http://jdet.janes.com) and Wertheim, Naval 
Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World.  Current numbers of vessels is from Jane’s and Chapter 
Five: Russia, 186. 
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into a developed port and offload.  Another weakness of the current Russian amphibious 
fleet is the relatively short ranges of its vessels, particularly of the new Ivan Gren class.  
The Mistral would bring a much larger unrefueled cruising range to the capabilities of the 
Russian Navy.  
F. NEW RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS BESIDES THE MISTRAL 
The Ivan Gren, Project 1171.1 is an updated modification of the older Alligator 
landing tank ships.  Its main innovation is an ability to use floating pontoons to support a 
long bow ramp to transfer armored vehicles to the shore, thus removing the necessity of 
the Ivan Gren to beach itself.120  While it can also carry standard cargo containers it has 
an extremely limited aviation capacity.  Its helicopter deck will only be able to support 
one Ka-29 HELIX B medium size helicopter.121  The lead ship of the class was laid down 
in the Yantar shipyard in the Kaliningrad region in 2004, and according to the general 
director of the yard, it will be handed over to the Russian Navy in later 2012 or early 
2013.122  The fact that it will have taken 8–9 years to build a LST is another example of 
why the Russian Navy is reluctant to rely on domestic shipbuilders to produce new 
warships on time. 
 
Figure 10.   Another artist conception of a completed Ivan Gren LST  
(From: anonymous) 
                                                 
120 Dmitry Gorenburg, Henry Gaffney and Ken Gause, The Current State of the Russian Navy, May 
2008 (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Strategic Studies [2008]), 48. 
121 Wertheim, Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 633. 
122 “Project Ivan Gren Landing Ship to be Ready in 2012 Or 2013 - Shipyard Head,” Interfax, April 
19, 2010. 
 41
G. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY 
In addition to the amphibious warships that the Russian Navy still owns, it is 
evident that it still possesses an amphibious capability – amphibious assaults were a 
principle part of Russia’s major operational strategic exercise Zapad 2009.  Seven large 
landing ships of the Ropucha class participated in amphibious landings on a defended 
shoreline on the coast of the Kaliningrad region.123  More recently, in July 2010, the 
major exercise Vostok 2010 again involved practicing opposed amphibious landings with 
ships from all four of the Russian fleets (Baltic, Black Sea, Northern and Pacific).124  The 
quick conclusion is that the Russian Navy is still capable of performing some types of 
amphibious landings without a Mistral.  However, the majority of the troops assaulted the 
beachhead via hovercraft (which were launched from Russian shores, not from other 
landing ships), smaller landing craft, and amphibious vehicles such as BMP-2.  Few 
troops came ashore via helicopter, primarily because the vast majority of amphibious 
assault ships did not support helicopter operations.  Only the Ivan Rogov class LPD has 
helicopter facilities, and none participated in the exercises.   
In both exercises, the Ropuchas and Alligator LST offloaded the majority of their 
troops and cargo via bow ramps directly onto the beach (see Figure 11). 
                                                 
123 Aleksandr Ryabushev, “The Amphibious Assault Wave Covers the Shore: The President of Russia 
and Belarus are Expected at the Exercise's Concluding Phase,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 
September 11, 2009. 
124 “Vostok-2010 Games: A Test of Russia's New Army,” RIA-Novosti, July 12, 2010. 
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Figure 11.   A Ropucha has its bow doors open and landing ramp displayed. (From PH3 
Dawn Schmelhaun, U.S. Navy) 
This type of amphibious landing is impossible if the shoreline is defended by 
enemy tanks, artillery or surface-to-surface missiles.  Another point of note is that while 
the World War II-style beach assault, with LSTs offloading troops and tanks onto the 
beach, looks impressive, the majority of the world’s shorelines are not conducive to such 
an assault.125  Less than 17 percent of the world’s coastlines are capable of supporting a 
conventional, D-day style landing.  But almost 80 percent of them are suitable for air 
cushioned landing craft (LCAC) and other ground effect vehicles.126  The Russian Navy 
can only realistically carry out a direct amphibious assault on a beach.  Effectively 
moving troops and equipment ashore requires a combination of helicopters and smaller 
landing craft, which are designed to carry both troops and equipment.  The current 
problem for Russia is that they do not have the numbers of dedicated assault landing craft 
                                                 
125 Kramnik, The Agony of Choice: Russia Looking for Best Amphibious Assault Ship. 
126 “Taiwan Report on PLA Over-Horizon Amphibious Capability,” Chueh-Ch i Tung-Ya: Chu-Chiao 
Hsin-Shih-Chi Chieh-Fang-Chun, Taipei, September 1, 2009. 
 43
to execute a large-scale amphibious assault from over the horizon.  As of 2011, the 
Russia Navy is has only thirteen landing craft and five air cushioned boats.127   
The larger problem is that the necessary “mother ships” or ships to carry the 
landing craft also do not exist in the Russian Navy.  Neither the Ropuchas, Alligators nor 
Polnocny have the capability to deploy landing craft.  These LSTs are designed for direct 
beach offloading, or for amphibious vehicles to drive off their ramps into the sea.  The 
Ivan Rogov could carry landing craft and assault hovercrafts in its well deck.  However, 
the only remaining Ivan Rogov class vessel, the Mitrophan Moskalenko, is no longer 
believed to remain in service.  As for the new Ivan Gren class under construction, it is 
designed as a LST to replace the Alligator class, not the Ivan Rogov class.  The Ivan 
Grens do not have a well deck to deploy landing craft, hovercraft or amphibious vehicles.  
The only option available potentially to the Ivan Gren would be to carry LCU/LCM on 
its deck and deploy them via its onboard crane.  Since the lead vessel has yet to be 
commissioned, much remains unknown about her true amphibious capabilities and how/if 
it could carry and deploy landing craft. 
Current amphibious aviation assault capability is also severely lacking both in 
helicopters and aviation capable ships.  In 2011, Russian Naval Aviation was reported to 
have 54 transport helicopters. 128  Of these, only 28 are dedicated naval assault helicopters 
(Ka-29 HELIX B).  The other 26 helicopters are Mi-8 HIPs, which have never been 
observed during extended naval operations.  The ships to employ these helicopters from 
do not exist either.  None of the Russian LSTs even have a helicopter pad, with the 
exception of the Ivan Gren which will carry only a single helicopter.  Again, the Ivan 
Rogov class had the capability for four helicopters but the availability of the remaining 
Rogov is suspect. 
The Ropucha’s and Alligators do not give Russia a standoff or over the horizon 
amphibious capability.   In summary, with only one possible Ivan Rogov LPD, and only 
two new Ivan Gren LSTs under construction, the Russian Navy does not possess the 
                                                 
127 Chapter Five: Russia, 186. 
128 Ibid., 186. 
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capability to execute any type of over the horizon amphibious assault against a defended 
shoreline.  The Mistral would be the first warship in over 30 years that would allow the 
Russian Navy to even consider an over the horizon amphibious assault. 
H. OTHER COMPARABLE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS TO THE 
MISTRAL 
At the Euronaval 2010 naval exhibition in Le Bourget north of Paris, Russia 
announced an international tender for the purchase of two amphibious assault ships and 
the transfer of technology to construct future warships.129  While it was assumed by many 
that the tender was simply a formality because the Mistral purchase had already been 
agreed upon, potentially competing amphibious assault vessels are briefly examined here 
by way of comparison with the Mistral (see Table 3).   
                                                 
129 “Russian Defence Ministry Announces International Tender for Helicopter Carriers,” RIA-Novosti, 
October 26, 2010. 
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Table 3.   Amphibious Warships Considered in Russian tender130 




Type LHDM/BPC LHD LPD LPD LHA 
Country of 
Origin France Spain 
South 
Korea Netherlands Russia 
Length 
(meters) 199 230.8 200 176.4 200 
Beam (meters) 32 32 32 29.2 50 
Displacement 
(tons) 21,947 27,514 19,305 16,948 30,000-40,000 
Range (nm) 11,000 9,000 unknown 10,000 5,000 
Troop lift 
450  
(900 for short 
durations) 
902 700 555 1,000 
Vehicle lift 
13 MBT / 60 
Armored 
vehicles 
46 MBT 10 MBT 170 APC / 33 MBT unknown 
Helicopters 16 30 10 6 25 
Helicopter 
landing  spots 6 6 5 2 6 
Landing craft 4 LCU / 2 LCAC 2 LCAC 2 LCAC 
4 LCVP + 2 LCU / 
2 LCM 2-4 hovercraft 
Crew size 188 243 400 701 unknown 













Diesel electric / 2 
podded propulsors Steam turbines 
CODAD – Combined diesel and diesel – 2 engines powering one propeller. 
CODAGE – Combined diesel and gas turbine–powering a generator which powers electric motors 
                                                 
130 All data on Mistral, Juan Carlos, Dokdo and Johann de Witt from Jane’s Fighting Ships, 
http://jdet.janes.com. 
131 Because the Project 11780 was never built, specifications are estimates only from the builder’s 
plans.  Data from Kramnik, The Agony of Choice: Russia Looking for Best Amphibious Assault Ship and 
Mozgovoi, Turns of the Plotline. Projects by Russian Design Bureaus are Not Inferior to Foreign Ones. 
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Figure 12.   Johan de Witt LPD (From Sergeant Major Gerben Van Es, Dutch Air Force / 
U.S. Navy) 
 
Figure 13.   Juan Carlos LHD (From Spanish Navy) 
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Figure 14.   Dokdo LPD. (From Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Greg Mitchell, 
U.S. Navy) 
The point here is that the Mistral is hardly unique.  All five designs are relatively 
comparable in terms of having a mix of troop transport capability as well as an aviation 
component.  Three designs have the new podded propulsion systems.  The Mistral did not 
offer a clear-cut advantage in multiple categories by itself.  That said, there were some 
strong preconditions that basically guaranteed the Mistral design as the winner.  The 
preconditions had nothing to do with capability however.  First, all the designs except the 
French and Russian ones were likely subject to the US International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) policy.  The United States could restrict certain technologies and 
components in Korean, Dutch and Spanish projects because they were American made or 
developed systems and technologies.  The Mistral by comparison, has no U.S. 
components in it.132  This fact alone removed the possibility of Washington blocking the 
sale; instead, strongly worded statements of disapproval are the most it could muster.  
Since the Russians desired not only the ships themselves, but also the associated 
technologies, it made sense for Moscow to go with a country that could offer the most.  
The Spanish would also certainly have hesitated to jeopardize U.S. relations over the sale 
                                                 
132 “French Helicopter Carrier Thought Favorite in Russian Tender,” Interfax-AVN, November 18, 
2010. 
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an amphibious warship to Russia.  The Spanish Alvaro de Bazan (F100 frigate) class 
warships were the first European ships to be fitted with the U.S. Navy’s Aegis radar 
system.133 Madrid would not risk jeopardizing future technology transfers from the 
United States. Also, the Juan Carlos LHD was designed for operation of vertical take-off 
and landing jets (VSTOL), such as the F-35B Joint Strike Fighter.  Russia has no VSTOL 
aircraft or plans to acquire such aircraft – therefore, a purpose built vessel for those 
capabilities would be superfluous. 
Perhaps one inference from the Russian selection may be that the Russians were 
looking at ships that had a significant aviation capability over a pure assault transport.  
The focus on aviation could indicate a desire for a multi-mission ship over pure assault 
via landing craft or simple main battle tank transport.  While Russia may not have chosen 
the Mistral based solely on capabilities, the Mistral does vastly add to the navy’s overall 
capability.  But again, the Russians wanted the French ship for the technology transfer of 
advanced electronics – the capabilities were a bonus.  The tender, it is believed, was 
offered simply to exert pressure to include more technology at a lower price.134   
                                                 
133 “F100 Alvaro De Bazan Multi-Purpose Frigate, Spain,” Net Resources International, 
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/f100/. 
134 Khorunzhiy, Russia: Ministry of Defense Will Probably Buy Helicopter Carriers from France. 
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I. MISTRAL CAPABILITIES 
 
Figure 15.   Internal cutaway of Mistral showing deck layout.  Also note propulsion 
system (from enibule.com) 
As has been discussed the U.S. Navy classifies the Mistral as a Landing 
Helicopter Dock (LHD) type vessel while the French designation is that of a “Bâtiment 
de Projection et de Commandement” (Forward Deployment and Command Vessel).  This 
BPC/LHD can perform the duties of a LHD but also has a significant command and 
control capability.  The Mistral is a 200 meters long multi-purpose ship with 21,300 tons 
displacement fully loaded. Because it is built to commercial vice naval standards, 
construction techniques to prevent combat or other significant damage are less stringent. 
It can transport 16 helicopters, 450 troops (900 for short periods), and 13 main 
battle tanks (MBT) or 70 vehicles over two decks (see Figure 15).  The Russians may 
look to rearrange the interior spaces of the Mistral.  The French version provides 
accommodations for 450 troops in staterooms of two, four and six men. 135  If the 
Russians opt for more austere conditions and prioritize troop capacity over marine 
comfort, the normal troop capacity may be around 900-1,000 troops.  On the other hand, 
the Russians may retain French configurations to save time and minimize redesign costs.  
                                                 
135 Manseck, BPC “Mistral” Class, 94. 
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Deputy Defense Minister Popovkin has gone on record to say that only minimal design 
alterations will be considered.136  Modular construction could allow for refits at a later 
time.  There has also been a greater emphasis on crew comfort in newer designs than 
traditionally found in Soviet era designs.  The Ivan Gren’s designers spent time 
identifying how to improve the living spaces and conditions for both the ship’s crew and 
embarked assault force.137  A typical Soviet era design, such as the Alligator LST had 
notoriously poor accommodations for its embarked marines.138  As part of its 
modernization effort and perhaps in view of a potential future professional military force 
vice conscripts, the Russian Navy may be focusing on improving crew conditions to 
improve conditions of naval service.  Also there is the fact that the current missions of the 
Russian Naval Infantry do not dictate a need to carry 1,000 men all in one ship. 
In addition to using helicopters to disembark troops, the Mistral can also deploy 
troops via landing craft from its well deck.  With an 885.5m2 well deck (57.5 m long by 
15.4 m wide by 8.2 m high), the Mistral can nominally accommodate four medium 
landing craft or two U.S. Navy LCACs (landing craft air cushioned).139  In terms of 
Russian equipment, as currently designed, a single Mistral could carry either two Dyugon 
LCU or four Serna LCU or four Ondatra LCMs.140  In terms of hovercraft, two Lebed 
ACV could instead be carried. 
                                                 
136 “First Two Mistrals Will have Russian Arms and Helicopters, although Need Refitting,” ITAR-
TASS, http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=11587 (accessed February 25, 2011). 
137 Aleksandr Karpenko, “The First Assault Landing Vessel in the 21st Century: Construction of a 
Project 11711 Large Assault Landing Vessel for the Russian Navy has Begun,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy 
Kuryer, February 2, 2005. 
138 Embarked troops in Alligator LSTs were “accommodated below the tank deck under cramped 
conditions in the lower No.3 hold.” Wertheim, Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 634. 
139 Ibid., 219. 
140 The Ondatra LCM can carry 1 MBT.  The Dyugon LCU can carry 120 tons of troops and vehicles, 




Figure 16.   Picture showing the open well deck of Mistral (From Jean Louis Venne) 
The ship is equipped with a 69-bed hospital capable of providing international 
Level 3 primary casualty support.  If additional space for casualties is required, the 
hospital can be expanded into the hangar bay.  The Mistral also contains a modern 
command center capable of supporting a staff of 150 people.  The ship has an advanced 
propulsion system, where there are no propeller shafts.  Instead, the shafts and propellers 
are replaced by two rotating engine pods with propellers to give the Mistral exceptional 
maneuverability (see Figure 17).  
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Figure 17.   Picture of Azipod on BPC Mistral (from Vincent Groizeleau) 
The ship is also highly automated allowing for a small permanent crew of only 
188 sailors.141  Compared even to other modern LHD designs, this is a very low number 
(see earlier Table 4).  This is another beneficial bonus of the Mistral, with the Russian 
Navy’s manpower issues and difficulties in moving toward a non-conscript based force.  
Having a highly automated warship would make it easier to man and potentially increase 
its deployment availability compared to other Russian warships.  However, fewer crew 
members means more reliance on automated systems to control the ship, including 
damage control efforts.  While on a cruise liner with such automated systems, damage 
control is less of a concern, but they become primordial on a warship sailing into hostile 
waters.  The commercial build specification also means that there are less watertight 
compartments than required for military specifications.  As an example, the Mistral has 
only one main machinery room, which means one hit could immobilize the entire ship.142  
The fact that Russia is willing to acquire a less robust design may indicate it is not as 
concerned with the possibility of significant battle damage as with gaining a multi-
                                                 
141 Manseck, BPC “Mistral” Class, 89. 
142 Dmitry Mamin, “Mistral Sailed Away, Open Issues Stayed,” 
http://rusnavy.com/nowadays/concept/reforms/guestfromtoulon/intro/ (accessed January 2, 2011). 
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mission platform.  Another indication may be that Russia does not envision operating  
its Mistrals in a high intensity conflict area.  
Compared to Soviet era and current Russian warships, the Mistral is basically 
unarmed and would require multiple escort ships if it ever were to sail into harm’s way.  
The Mistral only carries two very short-range defense missile launchers, two 30-
millimeter cannon and four machine guns.143  In comparison, Russian ship designs have 
always incorporated heavy armament on all their major warships, allowing a measure of 
self protection from a variety of threats.144  The Russians have already discussed 
significantly upgrading the Mistral’s defensive capability.   
Beyond stronger defensive weapons, the Russian have also asked for specific 
modifications to the flight deck, hangar bay, and elevators together with modifications to 
allow for sustained Arctic operations.145  The design modifications have to be made to 
accommodate the Ka-29 HELIX and Ka-52 HOKUM B helicopters.  As the Ka-29 
double rotor design is over four feet higher than the French Navy’s NH-90 transport 
helicopter’s rotors, the entire hangar deck has to be raised.  Also because the Russian 
helicopters are heavier than their French counterparts, the flight deck itself along with the 
two helicopter elevators must be reinforced as well.146  The official position has been that 
the design modifications are minor.  Yet in March 2011, the design modifications 
themselves were rumored to be one source of the disagreement on price between Russia 
and France.147  There have also been claims that the Arctic modifications will require a 
redesign of the hull as well as of the ventilation systems,148 so that ice will not form 
                                                 
143 Manseck, BPC “Mistral” Class, 92. 
144 For example, the largest amphibious warship in the Russian Navy, the Ivan Rogov class, carries 
two types of missile systems, both a short range and point defense system, two 76-millimeter cannons, one 
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145 Aleksandr Artemyev, “France Agrees to Share Mistral Shipbuilding Technology,” Gazeta.Ru, 
October 26, 2010. 
146 The maximum takeoff weight of the NH90 is 23,369 pounds, and while the Ka-52 maximum 
takeoff weight of 22,925pounds is similar, the Ka-27/29 HELIX family has a maximum weight of 
26,455/25,353 pounds, which is significantly more.  Data from Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2010. 
147 “Waters Still Choppy for Mistral Deal,” Intelligence Online, Paris, March 17, 2011. 
148 Aleksandr Mozgovoi, “Polundra. K Nam Idet Frantsuzskiy UDK,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 
Obozreniye, January 21, 2011. 
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inside the hangar bay.  Instead forced ventilation systems for the hangar bay will need to 
be developed.  While the extent of the redesign and modifications remains to be seen, it is 
certain that, while the Russian Mistrals most likely will be outwardly similar to the 
French versions, they will not be sister ships. 
 
Figure 18.   French BPC/LHD Mistral underway (From French Navy, 
Meretmarine.com)149 
J. RUSSIAN NAVAL CAPABILITY GAPS 
Based on the warships currently in the Russian inventory and the six Ivan Gren 
LSTs planned for, it becomes obvious that the Russian Navy lacks both the helicopters 
and the warships to conduct an aviation assault from the sea or a standoff amphibious 
assault.  It is then very interesting to note that the Russian Ministry of Defense has stated 
the Mistral’s primary role will be that of a command and control vessel, with its assault 
function to be secondary.150  Other Russian sources even have the assault function to be a 
                                                 
149 “Birmanie: La France Envoie Le BPC Mistral Au Secours Des Sinistrés,” Mer et Marine, 
http://www.meretmarine.com/article.cfm?id=107586 (accessed August 15, 2010). 
150 “Russian Defense Ministry Source Says Mistral to be Command and Control Ship,” Nakanune.Ru, 
February 26, 2010. 
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tertiary mission, with command and control missions and delivering attack and 
antisubmarine helicopters to assigned areas as more important.151  This has led to a 
conclusion that as Russia wants a total of four, this must mean the Russian Navy is 
planning on placing one in each of its fleets as a command vessel or flagship.152   
One idea could be that the Russians are looking to revitalize each fleet from the 
top down.153  This would mean starting with the capital ships first, and then build/acquire 
the necessary escort ships, rather than starting small and working toward the large ships.  
In looking at some capability gaps that the Mistral could fill in the Russian Navy, it 
becomes evident that the majority of those gaps are related to soft power.  While the 
Mistral does have striking power, or hard power, the way it is optimized and considering 
the supporting elements makes it more likely that the Russians are intent on using their 
Mistrals for missions other than direct amphibious assault. 
1. Command and Control 
Before looking at the official Russian plans, it is important to analyze the 
command ship role in the Soviet/Russian Navy.  The Soviet Navy converted two 
Sverdlov class cruisers in 1971 to command ships154 and in addition commissioned the 
SSV-33 Ural (Kapusta class) large command/intelligence ship in 1988.155  These were 
decommissioned in 1991 and 2002 respectively.  They were never used in a true fleet 
command role, such as the US Navy’s Blue Ridge class, currently used as the flagships 
for the US Navy’s 6th and 7th Fleets.  The SSV-33 Ural was utilized more as an 
intelligence collection asset than as a command ship.  The Soviet tradition for a fleet 
flagship has always been for it to be the most powerfully armed ship in the fleet.  This is 
                                                 
151 “Mistrals to Perform Command Tasks in Russian Navy,” ARMS-TASS, February 21, 2011. 
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why the Russian Navy’s fleet flagship is its sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov.  
As for the other fleets, the Peter the Great (Kirov class) is the Northern Fleet Flagship, 
and the Slava class cruisers Moskva and Varyag are the Black Sea and Pacific Fleet 
flagships respectively.  The Mistrals would not take over any fleet’s flagship role.  The 
Soviet tradition of command at sea is summed up by former chief of the Main Staff and 
deputy commander in chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Selivanov:  “A fleet 
commander must maintain his headquarters on the most powerful ship, having the most 
reliable means of anti-air and anti-submarine defense and the most effective command 
and communications systems…..assumptions about the Mistral as a headquarters ship are 
empty dilettante twaddle.” 156 
While his comments may be valid about the armament, his is off the mark about 
the command and control facilities on the Mistral.  Four warships, each with a command 
center for 150 people, is a capability unheard of in the Russian Navy right now.  Admiral 
Vysotskiy has said with the command and control abilities: “… if a Mistral is, say, in the 
Indian Ocean, it will have information about the Atlantic, Arctic, (about) simply 
everywhere.”157  While this is perhaps an overstatement, it drives home the point that the 
advance communications/control systems are exactly what the Russians are after, and 
why they want the full technology transfer with the sale, not just an empty hull.  While it 
is extremely unlikely that a Russian Mistral would be classified as a fleet flagship or even 
used for a traditional command at sea currently, the theatre level command and control 
may be more what Russia is looking for, especially in areas such as the Far East where 
established ground command posts are few and far between.  There has also been 
repeated Russian emphasis on moving toward a net centric command and control system.  
In July 2010, General Makarov told reporters that by 2015, Russia wants to have all its 
troops connected by new command and control systems in one information space.158  A 
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Mistral, or rather the technologies that a Mistral would have installed, would 
significantly help the Russian military in those modernization efforts. 
2. Hospital Ship or Disaster Relief Warship 
The Russian Navy also lacks a warship suited to Noncombatant Evacuation 
Operation (NEO) missions.  In late February 2011, during the unrest in Libya, Russia set 
about evacuating Russian citizens from the country.  To do so, it planned to send four Il-
76 transports as well as a passenger ferry which could hold 1,000 people.159  A civilian 
ship had to be sent as well as the Russian Navy lacks any type of vessel that could 
evacuate up to 950 people at once.  In comparison, the French actually sent the Mistral to 
Libya to help evacuate foreign workers.160  Transport aircraft are helpful in NEOs, but 
only so long as an airport is available, which may not be the case during civil unrest or 
natural disasters.  Also useful during civil unrest NEOs, is the ability to support or protect 
the evacuation of citizens with military forces.  Granted the Russian Navy could pull off a 
NEO operation of 1,000 people and provide military support, but it would take multiple 
ships vice one Mistral.  Getting multiple ships underway quickly (or even having them 
available) for a NEO operation is obviously more difficult than simply getting one to sea. 
The 69 bed full hospital of the Mistral is also an important capability in both 
combat and humanitarian assistance missions.  The Russian Navy though is not lacking a 
hospital ship capability.  As of 2011, Russia has three Ob (Project 320) hospital ships in 
service, one each in the Black Sea Fleet, Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet.161  These 
hospital ships all have 100 beds and seven operating rooms each, more than the Mistral.  
They also have helicopter landing facilities, although not as significant as a Mistral’s.  A 
Mistral may be more suited to responding to a limited or as a first responder to a 
humanitarian crisis.  The Mistral would not be able to replace an Ob, but this would be 
similar to US Navy operations.  During Operation Unified Response assisting the 2010 
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Haiti earthquake victims, US Navy LHDs and LSDs arrived on station first before the 
hospital ship USNS Comfort arrived.  A Russian Mistral would give the Russian Navy a 
better first responder-capable vessel. 
3. Long Range Cruises to Show the Flag 
Another reason may be that the Russian Navy is trying to acquire large warships 
to show the flag or project Russian presence around the world, or in areas of national 
interest.  Any hope that Russia had of building aircraft carriers was dashed in December 
2010 when Defense Minister Serdyukov said there were no plans to build any aircraft 
carriers “for the foreseeable future”.162  This was in response to leaks from the Russian 
Defense Ministry that Russia would start constructing aircraft carriers by 2020.  
Normally countries send their largest and most powerful warships to conduct show the 
flag operations.  For the Russian Navy, this leaves the Admiral Kuznetsov and Peter the 
Great.  It has already been announced that the Admiral Kuznetsov will undergo a major 
refit that will remove it from operational service from 2012 till 2017.163  While a Mistral 
is not an extremely powerful ship in terms of ship-mounted weapons, it could bring 
limited striking power with its embarked Ka-52 attack helicopters as well as its embarked 
naval infantry.  In addition, it is a large ship.  The Russian Navy may be reasoning that 
the Mistrals would be the next best thing to an aircraft carrier.  The Russian Navy may 
also be looking to acquire warships that can show the flag on long distance cruises.  As 
mentioned earlier, a Mistral has an unrefueled range of 11,000 nm.164  Besides the 
nuclear powered battle cruisers in the Russian Navy, the Mistrals would have some of the 
longest ranges.  Normally Russian warships have cruised with tugs and oilers in support 
in cruises to places such as Venezuela in 2008.  A brand new Mistral or several Mistrals 
would likely remove this logistical requirement. Not having to send warships with a tug 
trailing along would be a significant prestige boost for the Russian Navy.  The endurance 
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of a Mistral with 450 marines aboard is also touted as 45 days, again giving the Russian 
Navy significant range to operate.  Furthermore, the addition of a capital ship such as the 
Mistral will allow Russia to send different warships vice always sending the same ones, 
such as the Peter the Great or Admiral Chabanenko (a Udaloy-II class destroyer, often 
seen on foreign port visits).  An important point to remember though will be since the 
Mistral is relatively un-protected, either it will need to sail with an escort if any military 
activities are intended, or it will be cruising simply showing the Russian flag.   
4. Amphibious Assault 
The necessary landing craft and helicopters are required to conduct effectively an 
amphibious assault.  As it has already been mentioned, with only 28 Ka-29 HELIX B 
assault helicopters, Russian naval aviation would barely be able to equip its four Mistrals 
with seven each.  The sea based attack helicopter capability does not fully exist either.  
However, as discussed earlier, there have been plans to acquire more helicopters. 
The landing craft piece of the puzzle is also in similar shape.  The primary landing 
craft in Russian service have been the Lebed Air Cushioned Vehicle (ACV) and Ondatra 
LCM.  Yet the Lebed ACV and Ondatra LCM were commissioned in 1979 and 1975 
respectively, and are getting old.  To replace them, the Dyugon and Serna class LCUs are 
being procured.  In 2011, it was estimated that Russia had seven Sernas in service as well 
as a single Dyugon.165   Jane’s Fighting Ships estimates that four Dyugon’s are proposed 
in total.  Other sources though only see one Dyugon being constructed and no more 
Sernas.166  In the best case, these new craft give the Russian Navy a total of eight newer 
LCU and eight older LCM/ACVs.  Four Mistrals have the capacity for 16 LCUs 
maximum, so it would seem that the Russian Navy would barley be able to equip its LHD 
with the appropriate landing craft.  As a single Serna or Dyugon can carry one hundred 
plus troops, four such LCUs could almost offload the entire normal complement of naval 
infantry from the Mistral.    
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There are no current open source reports that indicate that Russia is looking at 
constructing new assault hovercraft.  According to the 2011 Military Balance, Russia 
does not even have assault hovercrafts that are capable of being carried aboard a Mistral. 
So any seaborne assault would likely be via landing craft themselves or “swimming 
vehicles”—vehicles that are amphibious.  There also seems to be a lack of upgrades to 
the equipment used by the naval infantry.  Currently, the naval infantry has no primary 
floating armor capable of landing, as the Soviet era PT-76 amphibious tank has been 
retired and the infantry’s other tank, the T-72, is not amphibious.167  Other newer Russian 
armored vehicles, such as the BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle or 2S25 Sprut-SD 125mm 
self propelled antitank gun had not been accepted in large numbers by the naval infantry 
yet.168  So, even if Russia has new amphibious assault ships, the naval infantry still needs 
new equipment if they were to assault a defended shoreline by sea.  Still, Russia possess 
currently the ability to conduct a limited seaborne assault. But the lack of significant 
investments in assault equipment indicates that these missions are not the navy’s highest 
priority. 
Currently the investments seem to indicate a desire to keep the capability, but not 
extend it greatly.  The helicopter acquisitions gives the multi-mission focus that Russia is 
looking for now, not purely an assault mission.  Of course, this could all change between 
now and the delivery of Mistrals to Russia in the coming years. But for now, while the 
Mistral could fill capability gaps in the Russian Navy, it seems rather that the navy is 
finding roles for the ship to do, vice identifying a need and then a specific platform to 
solve that problem.  The Russians may have decided on a LHD to acquire technologies 
and build experience because an LHD is a multi-mission ship, one that can be used for 
numerous roles.  This capability makes it easier for the Russian Navy to find missions for 
it, rather than adapt existing types to a specific mission.  
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K. GENERAL PLACEMENT OF RUSSIAN MISTRALS 
One idea regarding placement is that because there are four ships to be 
bought/built, each fleet will get one ship.  However, First Deputy Chief of the Russian 
Navy’s Main Staff Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev has said that the navy plans to base the 
Mistral, not in the Baltic or Black Sea Fleets, but rather in the Northern and Pacific 
Fleets.169  Two will go to the Northern Fleet and two, including the first one or two, will 
go to the Pacific Fleet.170  From a capability perspective, this makes more sense.  If 
Russia is looking to show the flag or project power overseas, it will have to use its sole 
aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov or one of its new Mistrals.   And with the 
Kuznetsov possibly out of the picture till 2017, the Mistral becomes the sole aviation 
asset for the fleet. The Mistral also could perform important humanitarian relief 
operations in crisis situations or be part of the global efforts against pirates off the coast 
of Somalia.  All these roles will require warships to be readily available at short notice.  
A general rule is to project power anytime, a minimum of three battle groups centered on 
either an aircraft or helicopter carrier would be required.171  Most importantly, placing 
two vessels in the Northern and Pacific fleet would increase the probability of having at 
least one warship available in time of need.  Furthermore, by keeping two ships together, 
one has a much more powerful amphibious strike force.  In any case, the Mistrals could 
also move from fleet to fleet, albeit slowly.  As mentioned earlier, the Mistral’s highest 
possible speed is only 19 knots and its max range cruising speed is 15 knots.172 So while 
ships could move from fleet to fleet easily for planned exercises or deployments, for 
rapid reactions to crises the ships would already need to be close to the action.  Both the 
Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet have vast areas to cover.  Stationing two ships in each 
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area, especially with the overall slower speed would give better odds on having one 
Mistral possible close to where it is needed.  This time required reposition ships means 
that homeporting ships in the Baltic or Black Seas is unlikely.  Also, from an 
infrastructure standpoint, as Russia will have to build new port facilities for Mistrals, it 
would be cheaper to only build new facilities at two locations rather than all four.   
1. Pacific Fleet 
Many believe the Mistrals are going to the Pacific fleet first because of the Kuril 
Island issues.  As Vladimir Popovkin173 has said, Russia has “…an issue with the islands 
in the Far East that remains unresolved from Japan’s point of view, though from our 
perspective everything is settled.” 174 General Makarov has also stated that, because 
Russia has no soldiers in Kuril Islands now, it needs a mobile means of moving troops 
there if necessary.  This is inaccurate as the Kuril Islands are currently home to the only 
remaining division in the Russian army, the 18th Artillery division, a second-tier unit with 
reportedly outdated equipment.  For General Makarov the Mistral is the best option as it 
is larger than any such ships owned by the Russian Navy to transport troops.175 
So if the Mistral’s purpose is primarily to move troops from Vladivostok to the 
Kuril Islands, are there better options, or is the Mistral really the best fit?  Even though 
Russia retains a large airlift capability,176 the disputed Kuril Islands do not possess 
runways of significant length to land large transport aircraft,177 or even airports that can 
operate year round.178  Airlifting troops year round is not a viable option due to the 
weather conditions sometimes found in the Kurils.  The Russian Pacific Fleet has four 
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Ropuchas179 which combined could transport up to 760 troops and 40 MBT or 96 
vehicles between all four.  Because the Russian Navy has planned on six Ivan Grens as 
well, it can be assumed that one or two may go to the Pacific Fleet.  Two Ivan Grens 
could transport 600 troops and 26 MBT or 72 vehicles.  Both the Ivan Gren and Mistral 
would be far more fuel efficient than the current Ropuchas which General Makarov 
claims burn 3-4 times as much fuel as a Mistral would. 180  Looking at straight transport 
capability, a single Mistral could carry 900 troops and 13 MBT or 70 vehicles.  If no 
helicopters were carried, a total of 230 vehicles could be carried.181  So from a 
transportation aspect, the Mistral seems to be an excellent asset to use as it can carry as 
much in one trip that would require multiple Ropuchas or Ivan Gren vessels.  One 
drawback may be that the Mistral would be forced either to offload slowly using landing 
craft, or it would have to use the extremely limited port facilities in the Kuril Islands.  To 
offload tanks and vehicles pier side, the Mistral requires a large enough pier to moor 
against to allow the vehicles to roll off from its second deck via a ramp.  Ivan Grens and 
Ropuchas would be able to off load their cargos without the use of an established port 
facility, instead directly offloading onto shorelines.  The helicopter capability of the 
Mistral would likely be wasted in a simple reinforcement mission, as the Ivan Grens 
could carry one or two helicopters to ferry troops around.  Also, the Ka-29 helicopters are 
not capable of carrying large external loads, such as vehicles.  The five Ivan Grens are 
estimated at 325 million dollars per ship182, while some estimates put a single Mistral to 
be estimated at 750 million dollars, without the helicopters.183  This price is currently 
subject to negations as well, but the point is the Ivan Grens are far cheaper than a Mistral.  
So in a reinforcement operation to the Kuril Islands, building more Ivan Grens may be 
more cost effective than using a Mistral or two for simple troop transportation if troop 
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reinforcement is really the primary mission set.  As Russia has focused on the Mistral 
over additional Ivan Grens, it could be inferred that the troop transportation is merely a 
nice to have capability, not a pressing need.   
The likelihood of a combat assault against an opposed shoreline of either Japan or 
China, while again not an optimal task for a Mistral unsupported by escort ships, is 
extremely unlikely.  An important consideration may be though that the Russian Navy is 
looking at the age of its Alligators and Ropuchas in the Pacific Fleet.  The newest 
Ropucha was commissioned in 1986, while the oldest dates from 1975.184  While these 
vessels are still currently operational, by the time the first two Mistrals enter Russian 
service (assuming 2014–2015 time frame), some Ropuchas will be reaching the end of 
their service lives (40+ years for some).  By adding transport capable warships sooner 
rather than later, this may indicate that Russia is attempting to get ahead of impending 
ship retirements.  By avoiding the need to try and prolong service life, Russia can count 
on two new warships to take the place of retiring Ropuchas.  In summary, two Mistrals 
added to the Russian Pacific Fleet would give it more sealift and sustainment capabilities 
than it currently possess, or could be a suitable replacement for retiring transports.   
However, the Mistral would not bring a significant combat capability in terms of a 
serious amphibious assault capability to either Japan or China however.  It is also not the 
most cost-effective platform if the desired mission was simply to move troops by sea. 
Russia desires the ability to reinforce the Kuril Islands for multiple reasons.  The 
main one is that the ownership of the southern four islands is disputed with Japan.  The 
second reason is that for Russia, the Kuril Islands provide access to valuable fisheries, 
holdings to significant mineral deposits and could hold new natural gas and oil 
discoveries.     
The possession of the islands also provides a military-strategic value.  By holding 
all the islands, the Russians can control the access to the Sea of Okhotsk.  In an extreme 
situation, for example the Russians could mine the straits between the Kuril Islands and 
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isolate the Sea of Okhotsk.185  This sealed off sea would provide Russian ballistic missile 
submarines an area to safely to operate from.  More realistically, the possession of the 
southern four islands allows the Russians a measure of control of the Sea of Okhotsk.  
But this is via forces on the islands, not the Mistrals.  Mistrals would serve little purpose 
in actively denying access to the Sea of Okhotsk to surface or air units.  In their 
unarmored state, they would be easy targets for an opposing navy.  Claims that the 
Mistrals are needed in the Pacific Fleet to protect the extended supply lines from 
Kamchatka to the Kurils are also a stretch.186  The Mistral cannot protect itself from 
surface or aviation threats, much less protect supply lines.  The Mistral has some 
offensive capability in the littoral regions with its attack helicopters, and some limited 
anti-ship capability with Ka-52MD and AS-20 KAYAK missiles.  However, against a 
modern surface warship with advanced surface to air missiles (as both the Chinese and 
Japanese have), it is unlikely that a Mistral’s helicopters could get close enough without 
assistance from other Russian naval and air force assets.  More realistically, the more 
significant offensive or protective capability the Mistrals could provide would be that of 
an anti-submarine platform.  The Mistral could carry more Ka-27PL ASW helicopters 
than multiple other surface combatants.  These ASW helicopters could cover a large area 
being based off a Mistral.  However, to be effective, the Mistral would still require 
escorts for self defense and prosecution of submarines.  The other tactical use for a 
Mistral in the open ocean would be to use its helicopters for over the horizon targeting 
for other warships.  Also in this role, the Ka-31 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) 
helicopters could be used.  Yet again the Ka-31 and Ka-27PL could operate from other 
Russian warships as well.  So a Mistral by itself could not greatly affect the situation in 
the Kurils.  Where the Mistral could become effective in a combat role is when it is 
supported by other escort warships and aircraft.   Again, while there are reasons for 
protecting the Kuril Islands, there are few direct military reasons calling specifically for a 
LHD. 
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The Mistrals do fit into Russia’s strategic focus on the Far East.  The Russian 
press has reported that the defense forces on the islands, the 18th Artillery division, would 
be unable to defend the islands for more than one or two days without significant support 
from the rest of the Russian military forces.187  Again, while the Mistral could aid in 
transporting reinforcements, the Pacific fleet already has sealift assets.  With the 
discussions to bring attack helicopters to the island, a mobile helicopter carrier that needs 
to be escorted loses value in protecting fixed assets. Recently the Russians have made 
statements and described intentions to build up their defenses in the Kuril Islands.  Some 
of these improvements include mentions of Tor M2 air defense systems (SA-15 
GAUNTLET) and Mi-28N Night Hunter helicopters being stationed on the larger islands 
of Iturup and Kunashir.188  Also mentioned by sources on the Russian General Staff was 
the possibility of a S-400 Triumf (SA-21 GROWLER) system deployment.189  The fact 
that Russia only has two operational S-400 battalions as of March 2011 seems to indicate 
that it would be highly unlikely that such an advanced and long-range system would be 
deployed to the Kurils.  Still even the mention of such an advanced system may indicate 
the priority that Russia places on the Kuril Islands.  Or the mentioning of such advanced 
weapon systems serves as an indication to China and Japan that Russian interests in the 
Far East will be protected. 
On the surface the Russians are claiming that the buildup is to protect Russia's 
sovereignty in the Far East.  Following the Russian-Japanese diplomatic fall out in 
January 2011, after President Medvedev’s visit to Kunashir Island, both sides have 
increased their rhetoric about ownership of the islands.  While there is some value to 
modernizing defenses, especially in disputed territories, it is not likely that the Japanese 
threat is the primary reason.  Russia is concerned with the potential threat of rising 
Chinese power on their border.  Russia has been very keen to not directly mention this 
Chinese threat, as seen during the Russian Far East exercise, Vostok-10, in which Russia 
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made specifically mentioned that the exercise was not directed at China.190  This was in 
spite of the fact that the exercise’s opposing forces had armored units and aviation 
assets—far more than expected of groups of terrorists, which were the notional enemy.  
Doing so would potentially jeopardize ongoing arms sales, especially the new sales 
announced in November 2010.191  It could also raise tensions, and Russia needs Chinese 
oil and gas purchases.  Instead of publicly admitting a focus on China, Russia can “bash” 
Japan for free, or at a significantly lower political price.  Statements about protecting 
Russian lands against the Japanese claims also go over well in the domestic arena.  With 
upcoming elections in 2012 for the Russian Presidency, President Medvedev can toughen 
his foreign policy credentials with domestic voters by confronting the Japanese vice 
risking more important relationships with China, NATO or the US.192 
The Russian Navy has begun to shift their focus of effort to the Pacific Fleet.  The 
point is not currently the actual war fighting capability in a true high intensity conflict.  
Rather it is simply the Russian naval presence and the ability to show other countries that 
the Russian Navy has not given up the Pacific to the US and China.  Some examples are 
the recent announced plans where Russia’s newest SSBN, the Yuri Dolgorukiy (Borei 
class) will be stationed at Petropavlosk-Kamchatski in the Pacific Fleet.  This is unusual 
as normally lead SSBNs have been stationed in the Northern fleet closer to their builder, 
Sevmash, in order to facilitate service and support.193  There have also been rumors of a 
possible movement of Northern Fleet’s Marshal Ustinov (Slava class, Project 1164) from 
the Northern Fleet to Pacific Fleet.194  The Marshal Ustinov would join its sister ship, the 
Varyag, giving the Russians two Slava class cruisers out of the three active cruisers in the 
Pacific Fleet.  The Mistrals would fit in as another capital warship to show Russian 
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presence and power projection in the Pacific.  Focusing on building up forces in the 
Pacific also aids the Russians in potentially overseeing the Chinese efforts to explore the 
Arctic.  China has been making efforts to explore the Arctic with its own icebreakers, and 
has indicated that it will continue to push, albeit quietly and unobtrusively, to have the 
Arctic available to all nations, not just the Arctic ones.195  As the Chinese shipping lanes 
to the Arctic would pass through the Russian Pacific Fleets area of responsibility, 
increasing Russian naval presence could continue to impress upon the Chinese their 
concern.  Again though, the Mistral fits into this large picture by being a symbol of 
Russian power projection, a modern day version of “gun boat” diplomacy.  The Mistrals 
themselves do not significantly impact the balance of military forces in the region.       
2. Baltic Fleet 
The reinforcement of the Kaliningrad region mission is another reason that 
Vladimir Popovkin has identified to purchase the Mistral.196 Once again, many of the 
same considerations discussed in reinforcing the Kuril Islands area are applicable in 
reinforcing the Kaliningrad region.  Again, the Mistral does provide a significant 
transportation capability, yet the Ivan Grens should be able to handle much of the 
responsibility as well.  The likelihood of Russia needing to rapidly reinforce the 
Kaliningrad region is also very remote.  Another point to reiterate is that the Mistral has a 
maximum speed of 19 knots, the same speed as the navy’s current Ivan Gren, Ropucha 
and Alligator classes.  So the Mistral will not get heavy equipment to a location quicker.  
The only major advantage that the Mistral has is that it can carry more troops and by 
using helicopters could offload them faster and to more dispersed locations.  Again it is a 
unique capability, but not one that the Kaliningrad region needs.   
Also, from a European perspective, stationing Mistral warships in the Kaliningrad 
region is far more provocative than placing warships in the Far East.  Doing this would 
likely cause significant criticism of France from the Baltic nations and other NATO 
members.  As it is in Russia’s best interest to keep France on its side (for future possible 
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sales, as well as service life support of the Mistrals), it is highly unlikely that Russia 
would be willing to put France in such a position. 
3. Northern Fleet 
Just because official Russian statements place the Mistral in the Northern Fleet 
and the Russians have requested cold weather modifications to the Mistrals, does not 
mean Russia is looking to further militarize the Arctic.  The most likely reason for the 
cold weather and hull modifications are because operating in the Northern Fleet ships 
will often encounter ice frequently throughout the winter months.  Simple ice protection 
will allow the reduction of risk of the Mistrals being damaged by ice.  One stated mission 
of the Mistral would be to perform search and rescue operations in the far North. 197  
When one considers the shrinking ice cap in the arctic will allow for more ship traffic on 
the Northern Sea Route, this idea makes some sense.  Russia has also admitted to having 
a shortage of rescue ships to patrol the far north.  In December 2010, Vice Premier Sergei 
Ivanov explained that because over 70% of Russian search and rescue vessels were in 
dire need of yard repair or modernization, it was actually easier to hire foreigners for 
search and rescue missions vice relying on Russian search and rescue vessels and 
helicopters.198  For a country hoping to have a strong say in the Arctic, Russia cannot be 
seen to depend on foreign assistance.  A Mistral with multiple Ka-27PS rescue 
helicopters would be able to cover a significant area in the Arctic.  Nonetheless, the 
Mistral may not be the most cost effective warship for rescue missions.  It also highly 
inconceivable that Russia would be looking to land troops on Norwegian or Swedish soil.  
Another unlikely mission that the Mistral could fulfill in the Far North would be to 
conduct resupply missions to the numerous Russian military and scientific outposts in the 
Arctic and along the northern coast.  Stationing a Mistral in the Northern Fleet again 
gives the Russian Navy a capital ship to demonstrate national interests or concerns.  As 
more countries look to explore the Arctic and take advantage of the possible resources, 
Russia wants to appear strong and capable of protecting its territory and interests in the 
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region.  From the Northern Fleet a Mistral could also be used for various port visits as 
well as sail down through the Mediterranean and support anti-piracy operations in the 
Gulf of Aden.  So while Mistral could be well utilized, there is no one major pressing 
need for an LHD in the Northern Fleet. 
4. Black Sea Fleet 
Some analysts have postulated that the Mistral will be going to the Black Sea 
Fleet primarily to threaten Georgia again.  Georgia is realistically the only country that 
Russia could threaten in the Black Sea.  Turkey is far more of a naval power than Russia 
in that region, plus Turkey controls the Bosporus Straits and the Dardanelles for entry 
into the Black Sea.  The Mistral does not fall under to the Montreux Convention199, but 
Turkey could make it difficult for an aviation warship to pass in and out, so Russia may 
just well elect to keep a Mistral out of the Black Sea.  The other countries in the Black 
Sea are also all NATO members.  As Prime Minister Putin has bluntly said, Russia would 
not need the Mistral to invade Georgia again; Russia’s army is perfectly capable of 
executing that task.200  As there are already Russian bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
air support from the Mistral would likely not be needed.  One comment was that the 
Mistral could rapidly reinforce Georgia in the winter months, when snow and ice would 
constrain supply movement through the Caucasus and Roki tunnel.201  Once again, other 
LSTs of the Black Sea Fleet could do this, or Russia could use its airlift capability.  A 
point that Aleksandr Goltz brought up is that the Russians have left tanks and artillery 
pieces behind in occupied territories to diminish the reliance on moving equipment 
through the Roki Tunnel, which Georgia would surely try to close in a future conflict.202  
                                                 
199 The Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, gives Turkey control of the straights and restricts non-
Turkish military vessels and prohibits some types of warships, such as aircraft carriers, from transiting the 
straits.  As a helicopter carrier with no fixed wing aviation capability, the Mistral is not classified as an 
aircraft carrier. 
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(April 15, 2010). 
202 Timothy L. Thomas, “The Bear Went through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five-Day War 
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So it seems the importance of equipment movement may be minimized by planning 
ahead, however troop reinforcement could be done fastest by aircraft. 
The one significant benefit a Mistral would bring to the Black Sea fleet would be 
its command and control capability in a large-scale land operation in Georgia again.  
However, as Russia accomplished its goals in 2008, it seems unlikely that Russia would 
again resort to a large-scale invasion, one needing sophisticated command capabilities.  
And if they did, they could always move a ship into the Black Sea. 
There was one other argument made for the need of a Mistral or two in the Black 
Sea Fleet.  In early 2010, it was suggested that the Russians wanted Mistrals by 2017, 
which was the deadline for the Black Sea Fleet to leave Sevastopol in the Crimea.203  
This was another extreme viewpoint that the Russian Navy would need amphibious 
warships to protect Sevastopol.  However, in April 2010, Russia and Ukraine agreed to 
extend the Russian lease on Sevastopol for another 25 years, plus another five-year 
option, bringing the new expiration date of 2047.204  This new agreement seems to 
remove any rational military reason for needing to reinforce Sevastopol.  Russia is still 
more powerful than Ukraine and is not in danger of being forced out of Sevastopol 
anytime soon. 
So, while arguments can be made in every fleet that a Mistral could play an 
important role, the argument that the Mistral would fill a current, glaring combat 
capability gap is not valid for any fleet.  Nor is the Mistral vital to the successful 
completion of likely missions.  Rather the Mistral would augment or improve general 
naval capabilities.  This reinforces the idea that the capabilities are not the primary reason 
behind the purchase of the ship.  The Russian Navy does not need the Mistral as a troop 
transport, as it has this capability covered.  Gaps do exist in Russian naval capabilities 
concerning helicopter assault and support as well as warships performing the command 
vessel function.  However none of these capabilities are crucially required for the current 
                                                 
203 Pavel Felgenhauer, “France Fears the Loss of Mistral Sale,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 43 
(March 4, 2009). 
204 Vladimir Socor, “Russian Black Sea Fleet Strengthens Presence in Ukraine,” Eurasia Daily 
Monitor 8, no. 15 (January, 2011). 
 72
and probable future missions of the Russian Navy.  All the missions covered in the 
various areas merely emphasis how the Russian Navy is finding missions for the Mistral 
to fill.  This multi-mission ability is also why of all the avenues to choose for technology 
procurement, a LHD has the most flexibility in terms of the full range of military 
operations. 
One important consideration must be kept in mind when discussing Russian stated 
intentions and basing locations.  Saying that the Russian Navy will use the Mistrals for 
command and control and humanitarian missions is far less unsettling to other countries 
than a statement declaring the primary use of such a warship would be amphibious 
assault.  The same argument holds true for basing locations, the Pacific is far less 
concerning for European countries than the Baltic or Black Sea.  While it may not be 
used in an amphibious assault role, it has the capability.  Plus, ships can move.  Lastly, 
these ships are not going to enter service at least until 2014-2015 timeframe.  Why would 
Russia want to antagonize European countries now with threatening statements and 
basing locations?  Much can happen between the construction of the ships and their final 
primary missions and basing locations.  By focusing on the other missions than direct 
combat, the Russians also make it easier for France to supply advanced technologies that 
Russia desires. If Russia had made statements saying this warship would help it control 
Estonia, it would be much less likely for NATO and world opinion to allow France to sell 
fully equipped warships.  Staying with non-threatening statements works in both Russia’s 
and France’s favor.  As Russia will get not only the ships but also the associated 
technology and knowledge, while France will get to produce warships, keeping 
shipbuilders in France employed. 
L. RUSSIAN NAVAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Soviet Union seemed never to be able to maintain its large capital warships to 
the point where their service life was as long as western equivalent units.  The Soviets 
spent more time and effort in building ships and submarines than the proper infrastructure 
to support them.  Russia has inherited this mindset from the Soviet Union.  Soviet built 
project 1123 helicopter and 1143 aircraft carriers (Moskva, Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk) 
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all never had proper base support and “merely bobbed at anchor before being sold for 
scrap.”205  The Kiev and Minsk were only in service for 15 years but reportedly in poor 
material condition in 1991.  It seems though at last Russian officials, such as Deputy 
Defense Minister Popovkin, realize that Russia does not have the proper port facilities to 
support a Mistral class warship.  If the sale is approved, he has stated that Russia 
recognizes that it will have to build the proper port facilities.206   
The French shipbuilder, DCNS has also been approached about potentially 
constructing naval bases for the vessels.207  Proper concern has also been raised about 
how Russia will repair French equipment and will there be long lasting French 
support?208  Another worry growing now is besides the fact the proper infrastructure does 
not exist, but also are the costs being properly considered.  As Oleg Tretiakov of the 
Russian Defense Ministry’s 1st Research Institute recently explained, the life cycle costs 
of Russian weapon systems themselves are often underestimated.  In the long term, these 
costs end up reducing operational effectiveness because necessary repairs and 
maintenance are often forsaken due to a lack of funds for upkeep.209  As Admiral Igor 
Kasatonov, a former deputy commander in chief of the Russian Navy, says, “you cannot 
just buy a ship, and that’s all!”210   
India bought the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshokov to be converted into a full 
deck aircraft carrier by the Russian shipbuilding company Sevmash.  The ship purchase 
was followed by contracts for MiG-29Ks to equip the airwing, followed by contracts for 
onshore service infrastructure and programs to train the Indian crew to operate and repair 
the ship.  The initial contract was for one billion dollars, but additional costs (and 
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production overruns) have cost India another three billion dollars.211  The worry is the 
same thing may happen with the Russian purchase of the Mistrals.  As it stands currently, 
the GPV 2011-2020 that was submitted to Prime Minister Putin before going to President 
Medvedev on 14 December contained five trillion rubles for the navy.212  While the 
construction of Mistrals is included in this sum, unmentioned is any funding for the new 
shore facilities or training.   
In March 2011, there seemed to be a setback in the contract negotiations between 
France and Russia.  The disagreement centered on the price of the vessels.  The 
disagreement centered over the French offered prices, which were 1.15 billion euros for 
the first two ships (vice the Russian desire for the first two ships to be only 980 million 
euros), an additional 131 million euros for logistic expenses and 39 million euros for 
crew training.213  It seems the Russians were indeed asking for training and 
documentation.  While it is unlikely that the disagreements would completely derail the 
sale, it is an important point to see that the Russians have seemed to give some thought to 
proper support for the life cycle of the ship.  As opposed to simply buying a ship, and 
then worrying about support and documentation later.  Furthering this point was Defense 
Minister Serdyukov who stated that “Russia is interested in two ships on which the 
French would be under formal obligation to provide post-sales servicing.”214  For now, 
Russia at least seems to be saying the right things to properly take care of the ship for its 
service life. 
Another concern that has been brought up was by Vladislav Nikolskiy, a naval 
expert who holds the degree of Doctor of the Technical Sciences.  In his view, the pod 
propulsion units of the Mistral will require frequent inspections, including dry 
docking.215  His viewpoint is that there exists a shortage of dry docks that can 
accommodate a vessel of the Mistral’s size in Russia.  To inspect and repair the azipod 
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propulsions system of the Mistrals, the ships need to be drydocked, as shown here in 
Figure 19, with the Mistral and Tonnerre in drydock. 
 
Figure 19.   BPC Mistral and Tonnerre at the Vauban Shipyard in Toulon (From Jean-
Louis Venne, 2009) 
As has been discussed, most of the shipyards in Russia use building ways or 
slipways to construct ships.  These cannot be used to repair a ship, unless the ship can be 
winched back up the sloping ramp for repair—practically impossible for larger vessels.  
Therefore, to gain access to the hull and the azipod systems, either a graving dock or a 
floating drydock would be required.  Table 4 outlines what type of permanent facilities 
the major Russian shipyards have. 
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Table 4.   Graving and Drydock capabilities at major Russian Shipyards 


















55m* None None 
Floating 






x 29m None 
* - According to OPK, this drydock is currently under construction216 
 
Upon first glance, it seems that the only place a Mistral vessel could be 
drydocked would be Sevmash.  This could present a significant problem in overhauling 
and inspecting Russian Mistrals.  However, Russia has also made significant use of 
floating drydocks at their fleet repair facilities.  As of 2007, Russia had at least five 
floating drydocks capable of servicing a Mistral sized vessel.217  One, a PD-50 class 
floating drydock, is located near the repair facility at Roslyakovo, near Severmorsk.  This 
floating drydock is large enough to accommodate the Admiral Kuznetsov, which has a 
length of 270 meters and a beam of 37 meters at the waterline, both significantly greater 
than the Mistral (see Figures 20 and 21).   Two more large floating drydocks are also 
located near Murmansk.  In the Far East there is one PD-81 class floating drydock outside 
the Chazhma Ship repair facility.  In the Black Sea area, the Novorossiysk Shipyard also 
has a PD-41 class floating drydock. 
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Figure 20.   Admiral Kuznetsov inside the PD-50 floating drydock (From Pieter Inpyn, 
2010)  
 
Figure 21.   Admiral Kuznetsov inside the PD-50 floating drydock (From Pieter Inpyn, 
2010)  
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So, in quickly looking at repair capabilities, Russia has at least one repair asset in 
each major fleet, save the Baltic fleet.  Yet as the third and fourth Mistrals are to be 
constructed in St Petersburg, it would not be a lengthy journey to the new shipyard and 
facilities on Kotlin Island.  The new drydock under construction at the Severnya Verf 
shipyard is also easily capable of accommodating a Mistral when it is completed.  The 
argument whether or not Russia has the capabilities to perform major service on a Mistral 
is settled—Russia does have the capability.  What Russia will have to do is build new 
piers to support the Mistrals in areas where they are stationed.  The most important factor 
is, while the Russians may have the capability, it remains to be seen if the Russian Navy 
spends the money, time and effort necessary to keep the Mistrals in a highly serviceable 
condition. 
M. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that there are a multitude of possible reasons for the 
Russians to buy four Mistral warships from France.  All of the reasons point to the same 
conclusions:  No specific analysis or capability review was carried out to determine 
which capabilities were required by the Russian Navy and how to fill them.  Rather, the 
Mistral purchase was indicative of a particular system acquisition, vice one based on a set 
of needed capabilities.  Even though the Russians put out an international tender for 
various warships, the fact this was done after France and Russia had entered into 
exclusive negotiations meant that the tender was done for show and legality purposes 
only.  Once the system was identified, the Russians developed roles and capabilities for 
it, not the other way around.  The Mistral was the Russian’s choice because it gave them 
the most technology possible, potential helicopter contracts to Kamov, and a vast amount 
of support to the defense industry to modernize.  The actual capabilities of the Mistral, 
while adding to Russian capabilities, do not instantly strengthen Russia as a naval combat 
power.  And while the capabilities gained offer a nice side benefit, they are not 
desperately required. Speaking on the details of the Mistral negotiations Anatoly Isaikin, 
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the director general of Rosoboronexport218 said: “When hundreds of millions are at stake, 
such contracts need years of negotiations.  It is ridiculous to expect that we would close 
such contract within several months.”219  Later comments from Defense Minister 
Serdyukov indicated a reluctance to place a timeframe on the contract negotiations, rather 
saying that “[the Mistral contract] would be signed when it was ready.”220  These 
statements seem to indicate that the priorities of the Russians are to get the technologies, 
building licenses and technical documentation for the right price.  If Russia truly had a 
pressing need for LHD in the next few years, it would likely have accepted the higher 
price for a speedier construction timeline.  This is not to say the navy’s goal of rapidly 
adding warships to its rolls is jeopardized greatly.  Even if construction begins late in 
2011 or even 2012, the Russian Navy will still get at least a few Mistrals faster from 
France then if it had to wait for domestically built LHDs.  
If Russia had truly looked hard at what missions it requires from its navy, an 
amphibious assault helicopter carrier would not be at the top of the list to fill the required 
missions.  As Pukhov writes,  
When [Russia] can’t build the necessary number of corvettes and frigates, 
let alone destroyers, throwing away several hundred million euros on an 
obvious luxury item is like living in a hovel and buying a Bentley and 
parking it in the yard together with old bangers.  This is an obvious 
attempt by a pauper to buy a luxury item.”221 
There is one conclusion that can also be gleaned from the selection of an LHD 
however.  That is that Russia is moving away from ships designed solely for a primary 
mission in a high intensity conflict and is focusing on lower intensity warships, capable 
of multiple missions.  
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III. EFFECTS OF MISTRAL SALE ON NATO ALLIANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The military considerations and potential reasons behind the sale are not the only 
important ones.  The fact that France, a NATO member, has agreed to sell the Mistral to 
Russia carries alliance implications.  The Mistral sale marks the first major arms sale 
between Russia and a NATO member.  What effects might the Mistral sale have on 
NATO’s cohesion?  What do reactions to this possible sale reveal about the fears and 
anxieties of certain NATO allies and security partners?   
NATO’s most serious internal crises have occurred when member nations have 
undertaken unilateral actions without consultation with allies or against their wishes.  An 
alliance without a common purpose or effective coordination and consensus is in 
jeopardy.  Simply put, today the fundamental problem is that the consensus on the 
common threat, which unified the alliance during the Cold War is no longer present.   
B. BALTIC AND POLISH CONCERNS 
The majority of the complaints concerning the Mistral sale have come from the 
Baltic nations, Poland and the United States.  The arguments against the sale fall into two 
main categories:  One holds that the Mistral sale ignores a history of Russian aggression 
towards its smaller neighbors, and may give Moscow the capability to intimidate them in 
the future—a concern that cannot be easily dismissed when pitched by the Baltic states or 
Poland who have been “sold out” by the West before.  While NATO certainly possesses 
the capability to defend them, they question the West’s will to do so and “honor their 
Article 5 commitments in a serious crisis.”222  There have also been debates over how 
significant the threat posed by the Mistral class ships in the Russian Navy could actually 
be.   
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Lithuanian Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Vytautas Landsbergis223 
stated that the sale demonstrates conclusively that France is no longer Lithuania’s ally, 
but instead has pitched its tent with Moscow.  For him, the French have violated EU and 
NATO principles for money, or they have “lost their mind.”224  While Landsbergis’ 
views are perhaps too harsh, he does represent the Baltic fear that France will not back 
them in a showdown with Russia.  
In November 2009, when news of the French-Russia negotiations broke, Estonia 
was already closely following the sale.  While Estonia did not criticize the sale at the 
time, Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet immediately consulted with the French and 
referred discussion to the EU.225  Latvia’s Defense Minister, Imants Liegis, said that if 
the Russians deployed a Mistral class warship in the Baltic Sea, Latvia might have to 
revise “its effective defence plan in terms of military and national security threats.”226   
The Lithuanian ambassador to NATO, Linas Linkevicius, was not as concerned 
about a ship or two appearing in the Baltic Sea as were others, but rather the principle 
that the sale represents.  After all, Russia has had amphibious warships docked in the port 
of Baltyisk for years and just recently conducted amphibious assaults as part of Zapad-09 
and Vostok-10.  While the Mistral class ships augment Russian maritime power, like 
others, Lithuania fears that the sale signals a potential fracturing of NATO resolve and 
that NATO allies might overlook potential Russian transgressions (or past transgressions 
such as Georgia) or Baltic security concerns in their pursuit of better NATO-Russia 
relations. 
There is also a growing fear in Estonia and Lithuania that NATO allies may 
trample on Baltic concerns in their rush to close sales with the Russians. In February 
2010, Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene discussed bringing up the sale at 
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NATO, because of the expressed concern that the Mistral seemingly gives the green light 
for more such military arms sales regardless of the security concerns expressed by fellow 
allies.227  The Netherlands and Spain have both been identified by an Estonian 
government source as eager to take advantage of the Russian market.228  Both countries229 
competed with France for the Russian amphibious warship tender, and both are looking 
to create or save jobs in their countries.  These countries had implied that “economic 
calculations and a chance to create jobs outweigh security concerns.”230  So the Baltic 
states’ fear is that professions of NATO solidarity will evaporate in a crisis. 
Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves also takes issue with Secretary General 
Rasmussen’s idea that the arms sale is merely a bilateral issue between France and 
Russia.  Why, then, do we have NATO if the priority is  “only a collective issue when 
you’re attacked but otherwise it’s all nineteenth century selling whatever you can?”231  
Latvian MP Vaira Paegle shares his disdain of categorizing the sale as a bilateral issue 
because in her opinion, NATO has an obligation to ensure that all its member states feel 
“equally safe.”232  The Baltic states want NATO to act consistently, and so remove 
doubts about their security.  When NATO applies varied criteria to different situations, 
this deepens the Baltic concerns that NATO may not act decisively in a crisis. 
This fear of major NATO allies picking and choosing how to deal with specific 
issues also frightened Poland.  Jerzy Nowak, the former Polish ambassador to NATO, has 
spoken of Poland’s desire to “make certain that NATO is able to automatically respond as 
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a defensive alliance.”233  In a perfect world, if NATO made it clear how it will respond in 
all situations, as well as what it deems acceptable and not, this would help to reassure 
Poland and the Baltics.  Unfortunately, this is not possible.  As Inis Claude noted, policy 
makers approach each case differently, not via the “doctrinaire application of a 
formula.”234  Policy makers highly value flexibility and the ability to tailor a certain 
response to a situation.  Also, reality is far less predictable than some politicians would 
like. 
Some Baltic officials initially did not believe that such a sale was possible.  In 
November 2009, Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip commented that “the whole ship 
purchase issue has been created with the purpose of causing strife among NATO allies” 
and that for Russia to purchase a warship from France would be very shameful for 
Russia.235  By purchasing warships from abroad, Russia would be admitting that it could 
no longer produce similar warships domestically, signaling a decline in ability and power.  
Thus the rumors of the sale could not be taken seriously in his opinion.   
The idea that the sale was based on a Russian desire to cause discord was also 
shared by a Ukrainian analyst, Sergei Zgurets.  His argument is that the Mistral is a poor 
fit for the Russian Navy, which has significant needs that are not fulfilled by an 
amphibious assault ship.  He reasons that Russia is purchasing the Mistral to curry favor 
with France and split NATO as its ultimate goal.236  Prime Minister Ansip too believed 
that the sale was implausible from a military perspective and that Moscow must have had 
another purpose, like trying to throw NATO off balance by inciting internal 
disagreement.  While this may be a beneficial side effect for Russia, it is highly unlikely 
that causing discord was Moscow’s true purpose. 
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Despite misgivings voiced by Estonian Foreign Minister Paet on the security 
impact in the Baltic regions237 in general Estonian public statements were more muted 
than those from Latvia and Lithuania.  This, however, does not mean that Estonia lacked 
concern about the sale.  Rather, correspondence with officials at the Baltic Defense 
College has indicated that Estonia may be presenting its concerns to France directly in a 
confidential manner, eschewing the public debate.  This may indicate that Estonia did not 
wish to take a dispute between NATO members public, a move that would serve 
Moscow’s interest by sowing confusion in keeping NATO. 
This attempt to keep the disagreement between NATO allies out of the diplomatic 
spotlight can also be seen in the U.S. response.  Initially there was a great deal of public 
clamor, from a letter sent by six U.S. Senators to the French Ambassador to the 
introduction of a bill by U.S. Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, all condemning the 
sale.238  U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates expressed concern over the Mistral sale and 
discussed the matter with his counterpart, French Defense Minister Hervé Morin during a 
meeting in February 2010.  Gates’ official comment was that “We had a good and 
thorough exchange of views on it.  And I’ll just leave it at that.”239  This terse statement 
seemed to indicate that Gates was unable to persuade the French to change their minds.  
The French Ambassador in his response to the Washington made it perfectly clear that 
France would support its NATO obligations, but that in Paris’ view this sale would not 
contribute to insecurity in the Baltics.  Besides, France would make its own decision.  He 
also explicitly stated the fact that the Mistral was a support ship that could be used for 
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humanitarian and national evacuation missions and so therefore the Mistral would not 
“represent a credible threat to the North Atlantic Alliance.”240 
In an interview with Gazeta.Ru in October of 2010, Philip Gordon, U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, stated that “weapon sales decisions 
are sovereign decisions for countries to make. And if a NATO ally like France is 
considering such decisions, we can have our views but ultimately it is a national 
decision.”241  It could be inferred that the United States was reluctantly giving its 
acceptance of the sale.  But it also may be true that U.S. objections were more forcefully 
put in confidential discussions with Morin.242  This view has been repeated by various 
officials in Lithuania and Estonia—that the message behind the sale raises more concerns 
than the ship itself.  This message was that some NATO members would be willing to 
ignore the security concerns of other allies to make a deal with a third party country.  
Defense Minister Morin defended the sale by commenting that one ship would “not make 
any difference with respect to Russian capabilities.”243  Yet Morin admitted to Gates that 
the Mistral is a power projection warship.244   
The Baltic countries do not believe that Russia would keep the Mistral out of the 
Baltic Sea in the future.  As an example, Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene 
expressed her country’s view that the West cannot predict what Russia will or will not do.  
She commented that “while we do not consider Russia to be our enemy, we cannot rule 
out the possibility of the military equipment purchased [the Mistral], which is purely  
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offensive in nature, can be used predictably.  We doubt the predictability of its use.”245  
In short, the Baltic states fear the enhanced maritime capability, given Russia’s 
unpredictability. 
C. EU COUNCIL/PARLIAMENT REACTIONS 
The EU Council was approached with two written questions on the Mistral sale.  
In April 2010, a Polish MEP asked: given the EU Council Common Position of 8 
December 2008,246 would the Council address the Mistral sale?  High Representative 
Ashton responded that export military sales were national decisions, and that the Council 
had no place to address such military sales.247 
A follow-up question came in May 2010 from multiple MEPs, who asked whether 
the EU Council believed arms exports to non-EU members should be reviewed by the 
Council itself.  Again, the Council responded that arms exports fell “within national 
competence” and that the Council had no intention of discussing the Mistral sale at any 
future summit meetings or meetings of the European Council.248  Debates have also been 
held in the European Parliament; none of them conclusive.  In Lithuanian MEP 
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Landsbergis’ opinion, “Debates without a resolution are just talking,” 249 and in fact there 
have been no resolutions even proposed on the issue.  During the main debate, held on 8 
September 2010, numerous members of the European Parliament questioned the sale and 
its impact on European security.  However, the representative from the EU Council250 
made it clear that there were no EU laws forbidding national arms exports.  Again he 
repeated the position set forth by Lady Ashton in her earlier written response concerning 
arms sales. 
A more recent question was again addressed to the EU Council on February 1, 
2011, when an Estonian member of parliament asked the EU Council why it does not 
hold Russia accountable for Georgia cease fire agreements; does the arms sale fall into 
the category of selling arms to a country that does not respect human rights and does the 
EU council think the export will affect the security of the Baltic states or Poland, and if 
not, why?  The only new questions asked were if the EU Council was aware of any 
guarantees against further export of the Russian built Mistrals as well as if the Council 
thought it was a good idea to have an EU country encourage Russia to invest in 
armaments.  As of April 2011, the EU Council had not yet replied, but will likely restate 
its earlier comments on the sale. 
Despite repeated requests to address the Mistral issue, the EU Council has shown 
that it does not wish to take a position.  One reason may be that the EU Council is 
reluctant to antagonize Russia by labeling it as either a security threat or a country that 
allows violations of human rights.  While this view is probably understood by Poland and 
the Baltic states as another example of the EU putting positive relations with Russia 
ahead of their concerns, there might be another explanation.  If the EU Council got 
involved, other EU member states’ arms sales might be at risk, such as German sales of 
submarines to Pakistan.251  Moreover, France would not want the EU to have oversight 
regarding its national arms export decisions.  The EU Council seems keen to avoid taking 
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any sides or promoting any type of double standard, yet also does not wish to label 
Russia as a threat.  This refusal to some observers represents the growing divide in 
Europe.  MEP Landsbergis expressed this viewpoint:  “When a member state stands 
against other member states’ opinions and natural security interest, questions on the 
European solidarity principle arise.”252     
In any case, Poland and the Baltic states do not seem to have any real support 
from the EU Council for their concerns.  Again, this lends support to the argument by the 
Eastern European countries that their concerns are often downplayed by the major 
Western European powers, especially when better relations with Russia are at stake.   
D. NATO RESPONSE BEFORE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE 
To the Baltic states, the clearest example of how their concerns are ignored or 
belittled came from how the impending sale was announced.  Both Lithuanian Defense 
Minister Jukneviciene and Latvian Foreign Minister Maris Riekstins announced that they 
would have preferred French consultations with NATO or EU members before 
proceeding with the sale, vice learning about the official sale through the media.  
Consultations would have “enhanced the spirit of solidarity” between NATO or EU 
members.253  Instead the French fait accompli shows a lack of concern for what Estonia, 
Latvia or Lithuania think.  Latvian MP Vaira Paegle also wanted NATO to develop a 
certain legal framework for individual contracts concerning military equipment sales 
between NATO member states and third countries.254  This would have given assurance 
to the Baltic states that NATO as a whole took into account the consequences that arms 
sales could have for a member’s security.  However, there have been no other comments 
of support of such a legal framework from the U.S., UK or any other arms exporting 
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NATO members.  This is likely because such a legal framework may be viewed as too 
restrictive and intrusive to national policy or impinging on the sovereignty of NATO 
members.  
Despite objections and informal protests from the Baltic states and Poland, NATO 
Secretary General Rasmussen has made it clear that he does not believe the Mistral sale 
has any threatening implications.  He has also downplayed the notion that Russia is still a 
threat.  In response to the military concerns of the Baltic states on the sale, Rasmussen 
has stated that he “trusted that the sale of this military equipment was in line with 
international convention and law.”255  He also declared that he trusted that Russia would 
never use the warship against any NATO member or neighbor.256  This seems a bold 
statement, one that could be seen as attempting to put restrictions on Russia.  However, 
Russian Prime Minster Putin has been unequivocally clear that Russia reserved the right 
to “use it [the Mistral] where and when we consider it necessary.”257  “We are buyers, 
you are sellers,”258 he told French President Sarkozy, specifically implying that Russia 
would not make any promises or agree to any conditions.  Based on Russian actions in 
recent years,259 it could seem to some that Rasmussen maybe taking a gamble in 
attempting to predict Russian actions.  The Baltic states are not looking for assumptions 
or beliefs from NATO; rather they want to see positive and continuous examples of the 
reinforcement of Article 5.  Unfortunately, instead of discussions to address their 
concerns, they were told that the Mistral would specifically not be on the agenda of the 
2010 Lisbon Summit.260  Again this leads the Eastern European allies to conclude that 
NATO–Russia relations are more important than their concerns, and that NATO 
countries have been given a green light to assist in Russia's military modernization. 
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Unfortunately, while some positive measures have been taken to reassure the 
Baltic countries, the Mistral sale provides yet another example of a broken promise from 
France to the Baltic nations concerning their security.  In February 2010, French 
President Sarkozy sent the French Secretary of State for European Affairs, Pierre 
Lellouche, to the Baltic states.  His mission was to reassure the Baltic countries that they 
had no reason to be concerned about the sale, arguing that “Russia can’t be placed under 
an embargo while pretending to treat it like a friend and partner.”261  The reassurances 
were that the vessel that would be built and sold to the Russians would have “no military 
equipment.”262  Secretary of State Lellouche went as far as to say that the French “will 
sell the ship without arms, as a civil ferry ship” and that there would be no transfer of 
military technology.263  It was also widely assumed that the French would withhold 
sophisticated electronics from the Russians.264  President Sarkozy even told President 
Medvedev that the ships would be sold without sensitive equipment.265  It seemed quite 
clear that while the French were willing to sell a warship of the Mistral class, they would 
be selling primarily the hull and propulsion system, and not the electronics or armaments, 
and made this point very clear to their Russian buyers.  
These statements and views contradicted Russian demands that, while at first 
were vague, began in early January 2010 to insist on technology transfers as part of the 
deal.  Russian Prime Minister Putin stated that Russia would only be interested in a deal 
for the Mistral if “it is accompanied with a transfer of technologies.”266  Admiral 
Vysotskiy has repeatedly stated that the deal would not be completed unless France 
offered technologies with the sale.  He was quoted as saying that “[Technology 
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transfer]…is the leading condition of the deal.  If this does not happen, it makes no sense 
to undertake it [the entire Mistral sale].”267  This type of statement seems to indicate that 
the ship and its capabilities themselves are not the overall objectives.  Vysotskiy also has 
strongly highlighted the need to secure the onboard electronics of the Mistral as the 
Russian defense industry is incapable of producing the necessary components.268  
Everyone in authority in Russia, from Medvedev to Putin to Admiral Vysotskiy, has 
made it clear that the Russians are not going to purchase simply an empty hull. 
As the Russian official government position was clear on their demands for 
technology, some analysts, such as Ruslan Pukhov of CAST, wrote that France would 
never sell the electronics the Russians wanted.269  Another prevailing view was that 
France would placate its allies by selling the Mistral unfinished to Russia, but provide the 
desired equipment as an after-sale retrofit.270  It seemed fairly certain in any case that the 
French would at least honor in some part their promises to the Baltic states. 
It must have been disconcerting to the Baltic states in July 2010 when an 
unnamed Russian, who was part of the Mistral negotiating team, stated that the Russians 
were not buying an empty hull, but rather a ship with all the applicable navigation and 
technical equipment, “including the combat” components.271  This was followed later by 
official statements from DCNS272 that it was ready to deliver the Mistral to Russia 
without any restrictions.  Pierre Legros, a DCNS manager, stated that “The Mistral could 
for example be provided with the ship’s command system, cabling and general 
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communications”273—exactly what the French had previously promised not to sell with 
the Mistral.  French Prime Minister Francois Fillon even said in December 2010 that 
there was no problem with the technology transfer and he fully expected the sale to go 
through.274  This was in direct contrast to Lellouche’s earlier statements.  Fillon explained 
the technology transfer as a non-issue, since the Mistral was simply “a transport and 
command vessel.”275  The transport technology is negligible, but the command and 
control aspect is critical, as a potential use for the Mistral as discussed earlier will be that 
of a command and control ship.  Giving the Russians improved command and control 
capabilities could boost their overall combat effectiveness.  There is also the fact that the 
transfer of shipbuilding technology will aid the Russian shipbuilding industry to become 
more efficient. 
The idea of selling the Mistral without weapons was more a symbolic point than 
anything else.  Again, the Mistral only carries two very short-range point defense missile 
launchers, two 30-millimeter cannons and four machine guns.276  The Mistral would 
require the presence of other warships to escort it in any type of combat situation.  In 
comparison, Russian ship designs have always incorporated heavy armament on all their 
major warships, allowing a measure of self protection from a variety of threats.  As 
mentioned earlier the largest amphibious warship in the Russian Navy, the Ivan Rogov 
class, carries two types of missile systems, both a short range and point defense system, 
two 76-millimeter cannons, one 122-millimeter cannon, two 40-barreled rocket launchers 
and four 30-millimeter cannons.277  It can therefore be concluded that the French 
weapons were never a significant factor for the Russians and that France’s promise was 
an empty pledge.  Rather the technologies inside the Mistral are what the Russians are 
after. 
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Open source reporting has indicated that the Russians are getting the SENIT 9 
combat system as well as advanced radars. 278  SENIT (Système d'Exploitation Navale des 
Informations Tactiques or Naval Operating System for Tactical Information) 9 is a 
combat management system that takes data from various on-board and off-board sensors 
and provides the operator a 3-D fusion of data.279  It is not necessary to go into the 
classified details of what the system actually provides, but rather focus on the important 
point that the SENIT 9 system offered with the Mistral is the same system that is installed 
in the French BPCs and is a modified version (for the BPC mission) of what the French 
Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and the majority of French surface warships utilize.  
This is not a downgraded system designed only for export.  The Russians will be getting 
top of the line command and control systems, one currently employed by a NATO 
country, and if some of the open source reports are correct, minus only the NATO 
classified codes.   
There are also reports that the Russians will be getting the same radars, the Thales 
MRR-3 Next Generation radar and a Racal-Decca helicopter control radar, as the French 
BPCs.280  The Russians have even gone as far as to ask for Link-11 and Link-16281 
systems to be installed282.  These systems would allow the Russian Mistrals to exchange 
data link information with NATO navies.  This would be far more than cooperation, 
rather closer to integration.  One potential thought is that Russia is looking to increase 
interoperability with NATO navies, perhaps in peacekeeping operations or anti-piracy 
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operations.  Another viewpoint is that Russia is simply trying to acquire modern data link 
systems to modernize its forces.  The problem in general is that NATO Link 11/16 
systems are not compatible with the current data link systems aboard Russian warships.  
So it makes little tactical sense to have four warships operating one data link system, and 
the rest of the navy on another system.  These separate data link systems would also 
defeat the stated intentions about using a Mistral as a command and control ship.  To be 
effective, or even integrated into Russian naval operations, the Russian Mistrals will have 
to be outfitted with Russian data link and communication systems.  Besides looking to 
reverse engineer the data link systems, one of the only other reasons that makes some 
sense is possibly the Russians are interested in increasing interoperability with NATO, at 
least in principle. 
For now, France has demurred on the data links, claiming all NATO allies would 
have to agree.  The U.S. would also be able to block the transfer as much of the 
technology for Link 11 and 16 initially came from the United States.  Still, it seems the 
Russians are actively pushing for as much technology as they can get.  The actual 
capabilities are not the important issue, it is rather the fact that the Russians will not be 
just getting empty hulls, but rather electronic equipment that is almost equivalent to what 
is on NATO warships. 
The SENIT 9 systems are reportedly not to be sold with a production license so 
Russia would be unable to produce their own domestic version legally.  Still four vessels 
with an advanced command and control capability, fusing variety of sensors’ information 
will bring a new capability to the Russian Navy, if it can be properly integrated with 
existing Russian systems on other warships. 
As some NATO allies believe that France has already reneged on one promise, 
those allies will continue to fear that Russia will acquire a significant technological 
upgrade during the next ten years of cooperation between France and Russia in building 
these warships. 
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E. LISBON SUMMIT RESULTS 
The Eastern European allies hoped that the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit would 
underline/strengthen NATO’s commitment to collective defense.  The general reaction 
immediately following the summit was one of cautious optimism by most countries.  To 
the relief of the Baltic states and Poland, the new Strategic Concept specifically 
confirmed that NATO’s core task is territorial defense and allied solidarity in the event of 
an attack.  The new Strategic Concept called for NATO “to carry out the necessary 
training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our 
defence.”283   
In spite of some positive developments for reassurance, there have been some 
misgivings or concerns that not enough has been done.  While it has been acknowledged 
that NATO defense plans have been drafted for Poland and the Baltic states, some in 
those countries would have liked to see a statement of their formal approval in the final 
summit documents or in another official public forum vice out in the open public.284   
Another concern that was raised by a Czech analyst was how the defense budget 
cuts of the European NATO nations would potentially affect any security pledges.  The 
UK is looking at trimming 30,000 soldiers and 25% of its defense budget over the next 
four years, while France is cutting 2–5 billion euros from their defense budget as 
Germany cuts 40,000 soldiers.285  With cuts such as these, will the Western European 
allies be able to come to the defense of the Baltic states, or would that task, should it 
arise, fall upon the United States?  This question is related to the underlying fear that, 
despite promises, the Western European allies might find some excuse or reason not to 
aid in the defense of the Eastern European members. 
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A Polish political analyst, Grzegorz Kostrzewa-Zorbas, made an interesting point 
about what NATO should have done to reassure Poland and the Baltic States that 
defensive aid would come their way in a conflict.  His point was that, in regard to Article 
5, NATO should specify precisely that members will assist each other with military 
means, and not just humanitarian aid.286  While such a specific and detailed statement by 
NATO seems extremely unlikely to ever be agreed upon by all members, this suggestion 
does reveal Polish fears that some NATO allies might ”fulfill” their Article 5 
commitments by supplying something other than true military support.         
On the other hand, Sven Mikser of the Estonian Foreign Affairs Committee, 
indicated that he was satisfied that the NATO Strategic Concept protected Estonia.  
Mikser noted that the issue of defense plans as well as exercises was specifically 
addressed in the Strategic Concept.287  These differences of opinion generally reflect the 
“wait and see” attitude of the eastern European allies.  Some are looking at positive 
statements from the Lisbon Summit while others continue to raise questions about the 
new Strategic Concept and related NATO polices and activities. 
Specifically with respect to the Mistral, there was not much discussion in open 
sources following the summit (perhaps because the Mistral was specifically off the 
summit agenda288).  There was also no reference to any arms sales or to developing any 
legal conditions responding to member nation concerns over arms sales.  The only 
specific comments on the Mistral came from the new Latvian Defense Minister Artis 
Pabriks whose statements were in direct contrast to earlier fears expressed by the Latvian 
Defense Ministry.  Defense Minister Pabriks noted that Latvia has resolved the majority 
of its concerns with France over the Mistral.  Latvia’s main concern was the lack of 
communication and consultations behind the sale.  Pabriks stated: “I do not think that 
there would be any point in our returning to this issue of the Mistral because I think we 
can resolve all of our concerns within NATO, taking our new strategic concept into 
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account.”289  The fact that Latvia is publicly content with no longer challenging the 
Mistral sale seems to indicate an acceptance that the sale would proceed despite any 
security misgivings it may have.  Latvia may also be trying to present a unified front to 
Russia, placing its trust in the Article 5 reassurances and its NATO members instead of 
reacting to a Russian action. 
F. NATO REACTIONS POST FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT 
There was little official NATO reaction concerning either the official 
announcement on 24 December 2010, or the signing of an inter-government agreement 
on January 25 for the construction of four Mistrals for the Russian Navy.290  Rather 
NATO Secretary Rasmussen reiterated the official NATO view point in his January 
monthly press conference that the sale was a “bilateral arrangement” between Russia and 
France.  He went on to state that NATO took “for granted that Russia will not in any way 
use this military equipment against any NATO ally or neighbor.”291  Again this seems to 
fall into the category of wishful thinking.  Russia has clearly rejected any notion of 
restrictions on the placement or use of its Mistrals.  This viewpoint can also be 
considered in the framework of the NATO-Russia reset idea, where improving relations 
with Russia is very important.  The Russians have not given any indications that they 
plan on using these warships in a threatening way.  In fact they have specifically touted 
the non combat abilities of the Mistrals publicly for possible Russian missions.  As was 
mentioned earlier, the initial Russian reports of basing the Mistrals in the Kuril Islands is 
also the least threatening or provocative to NATO and other European countries.  The 
point is though, a country’s stated intentions and capabilities are two different things.  
Now that Russia will be gaining a capability, NATO cannot simply ignore it.  The fact 
that the capability is being publicly glossed over or minimized underlines the concerns of 
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some of the Baltic states.  For NATO to remain credible, even if the chances are 
extremely remote, updates to plans accounting for new capabilities should be undertaken. 
G. BALTIC REACTIONS POST-OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT 
After the official agreement announcements, each Baltic country, as well as 
Sweden and Norway reacted in its own way.  Lithuania came out with the loudest public 
disapproval of the sale, while Latvia made few comments and Estonia has been quiet.  In 
Lithuania and Latvia however, various levels of concern have been voiced by different 
government officials.   
In Lithuania, Defense Minister Rasa Jukneviciene called France’s decision “a big 
mistake.”292  She went on to reiterate the Lithuanian viewpoint that it was not about the 
military capability but rather the principle and precedent of the sale.  Downplaying the 
severity of the sale’s impact was the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Andrius Kubilius.  An 
official government spokesperson for the prime minister stated that “possible concerns 
over the sale of such weaponry are soothed by the news that it can no longer be produced 
in Lithuanian’s neighborhood.”293  This seems to indicate that Kubilius is more reassured 
by the fact that Russia evidently no longer has the capability to build its own amphibious 
assault warships and has to buy them abroad than by the actual warships themselves.  
This viewpoint conveniently overlooks the fact that Russia is planning on building two 
Mistrals in a modernized shipyard outside St. Petersburg.  While the Russians are not 
planning to build Mistrals in the Kaliningrad region, St. Petersburg is only approximately 
480 nautical miles away via the Baltic.  This official government statement 
oversimplifying the facts seems to indicate at least some desire to minimize and dismiss 





                                                 
292 “Mistral Sale to Russia is Big Mistake,” Baltic News Service, December 27, 2010. 
293 “Lithuania Questions France-Russia Warship Deal,” AFP (North European Service), January 25, 
2011. 
 100
of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaite, who has emphasized that Lithuania’s security is 
guaranteed by NATO which has even drawn up special defense plans for it, so therefore 
there is no need to worry.294  
The Latvian view is consistent with their statements after the Lisbon Summit.  
Latvian Defense Minister Artis Pabriks put forth a softer line than his Lithuanian 
counterpart.  While he criticized France for ignoring the viewpoint of the Baltic states, he 
did not think the sale would directly affect Latvia’s security as “the sale has no dramatic 
effect on either the balances of forces in the region or NATO strategy in the Baltic 
states”.295  In a continuing theme, Latvia Foreign Minister Girts Valdis Kristovskis  
minimized any threat and instead focused on the positive aspect of the sale, that because 
Russia was buying equipment from NATO, it “must lack technology, it is weaker than we 
[NATO] have been thinking.”296  In addition, he again touted the familiar statement that 
Russia has said it would not place these warships in the Baltic Sea, so there is no threat.  
Again, this statement conveniently overlooks the point that the Russian Mistrals can 
move.  While the actual military capability is not the issue, the interesting point is how 
Latvia has downplayed the threat.  One theory was that Latvia was avoiding publicly 
criticizing Russia in return for more favorable gas prices.297  This seems unlikely since 
Russia does not need Latvian goodwill for the sale.  Rather this may just be part of 
Russia’s desire to ensure continuing contracts with energy dependant states and forestall 
them from looking elsewhere.  The Latvian response could indicate a reluctance to speak 
out as one of the smaller members of NATO, as their viewpoint does not carry as much 
weight as the larger NATO members (although since NATO works on the consensus 
principle, it still has influence on official NATO actions).  However, a viewpoint 
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currently held in Latvia is best expressed by a daily newspaper there asking if Latvia’s 
role “is that of a film extra who has no lines to recite?”298 
Estonia has remained quiet since 2009.  Estonia officials also declined to 
comment on the sale after the January 25 announcement.299  One viewpoint is that if the 
Russians were to ever use or threaten to use Mistrals in the Baltic, it is more than simply 
a concern for Estonia, but rather all the other border states with Article 5 security 
guarantees.  The security implications need to be analyzed between multiple countries.  
As a member of the Baltic Defense College has mentioned, if Estonia were to voice its 
concerns alone, it could prove to be counterproductive as one of the smallest members of 
NATO.  The Estonian Ministry of Defense indicated they have accepted official 
explanations from French Secretary of State for European Affairs Pierre Lellouche that 
no NATO member interests will be damaged by the sale.300  There have been concerns 
voiced about Russian intentions, but fewer direct attacks on the French in contrast to 
Lithuania.  One of the few direct reactions to the sale has been the call by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Estonia Defense Forces Ants Laaneots, that to ensure 
Estonian national security, Estonia should begin to build up a coast guard.301  Still this is 
a defensive reaction, and not one that would be unsettling to other NATO allies.  In fact, 
most member countries would welcome the additional capability of a member nation.  In 
short Estonia has eschewed the public debate over the Mistral, instead watching carefully 
the ongoing negotiations of price and basing between France and Russia, and avoiding 
contributing to any internal NATO discord.   
France has attempted to respond to some of the criticisms of the sale once it was 
announced.  In March 2011, Francois Laumonier, the French Ambassador to Lithuania 
explained again that France did not see Mistral sales as threatening Lithuanian 
security.302  He went on to reiterate the French position that integrating Russia into 
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European affairs would provide more security for all European nations.303  These 
statements likely did not draw as much attention as his further comments on the reason 
behind the sale.  Ambassador Laumonier stated 
Mistral sales reflect the political will of France to improve its economic 
situation by way of an economic deal.  The deal means 5 million hours of 
work hours to our employees – this is four years of work for a thousand 
people.304 
This statement alone voiced the fear of Lithuania and other smaller members, that 
France would discard a NATO allies concern in light of providing for its own economic 
well being, and do so openly.  While this reasoning cannot be completely faulted, it does 
lessen the trust value that Lithuania and other smaller NATO allies have in some of the 
large NATO members.  It also reconfirms the notion for smaller members that their 
opinions are not taken into account.   
Ambassador Laumonier also rejected the notion about any internal NATO 
criticism of the plan, specifically stating in addition that “we [France] do not think our 
actions lacked transparency.”305  This is in direct contrast to early February 2010, when 
the Defense Ministers of both Latvia and Lithuania publicly decried the fact that they 
learned about the sale through the media.306 The fact that both countries specifically 
brought up the fact they were not consulted, and the lack of consultation was one of their 
issues with the sale, seems to indicate that the latest French statements are again trying to 
downplay the entire issue.  The sweeping under the rug, again leads to further mistrust in 
the Baltic regions. 
Swedish and Norwegian official statements are also interesting.  Norway has 
taken the position that it will not comment on “unsubstantiated rumors about Russia’s 
disposal of its own defense” in response to inquiries about the potential basing of 
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Mistrals in either the Baltic Sea or Russia’s Northern Fleet, based at Severomorsk.307  
Sweden has taken the viewpoint that the effects of the Mistrals on the security of the 
Baltic Sea need to be evaluated and discussed.308  Reports surfaced in the fall of 2010 that 
the defense minister of the Baltic nations and Scandinavian ones were interested in 
setting up discussions on common security matters in the Baltic.309  After the sale was 
announced, the Lithuanian Parliament speaker Ireana Degutiene proposed for Nordic and 
Baltic countries to “jointly discuss urgent security issues, such as the sale of French 
Mistral warships to Russia, on high level and on the regular bases.”310  This idea has 
found support in other countries as well, specifically Sweden via the Swedish Speaker of 
Parliament Per Westerberg. 
On February 8, 2011, the Estonian and Swedish Defense Ministers signed a 
framework agreement on defense cooperation, with emphasis on military training.311  
Lithuania is also interested in joining the EU Nordic Battle group312, which Estonia is a 
part of.  A strengthened Nordic-Baltic security policy agreement covering a wide range of 
missions is potentially to be signed in April or May 2011.313  Great Britain is also 
rumored to be interested in this Nordic-Baltic Agreement.314  The fact that some of the 
Baltic nations are turning to bilateral security agreements with the Nordic states is 
indicative that they do not intend to rely solely on NATO for their protection or 
assistance. 
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Since the potential sale of the Mistral first became public in late 2009, the 
statements from various NATO allies have provided an insight as to the anxieties in 
certain member countries.  The sale has reinforced the impression in the Baltic States and 
Poland that major NATO countries continue to ignore their security concerns, that 
providing Russia with a more modern capability for aggression were either ignored or 
kept quiet in the interest of alliance unity.  The fact that France did not consult with any 
allies was a damaging blow to the confidence of the Baltic states and Poland.  It implied 
that they are still second-class member states, whose inputs do not matter.  The fact that 
France did not consult with other allies was evidently not a consolation to Poland and the 
Baltic States.  
If the Baltic States truly felt their concerns would be fairly heard and respected in 
NATO councils, there would be less chance that the emerging Baltic-Scandinavian 
defense consultations could potentially weaken NATO.   
Instead, NATO and France have reacted to Baltic and Polish warnings about 
Russian aggressiveness by dismissing them.  This merely reaffirms the continuing Polish 
viewpoint that NATO Allies often proclaim Polish concerns as being “hysterical or 
historical.”  Eastern European countries are not opposed to better NATO-Russia 
relations; they are just concerned that better relations might be pursued at their expense.  
While the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept said the right things, for the affected 
nations, words are not enough.  Defense plans and pledges to honor Article 5 
commitments are a good start, but actions speak louder than words.  Exercises are good 
examples of providing reassurance but the trust and confidence gained by the positive 
measures may be easily undone by events that minimize or even just seem to minimize 
Eastern European concerns, such as the Mistral sale.  When promises by France to the 
Baltic states are broken, these states see proof that they do not count.  France’s counter 




Furthermore, France has pointed to its direct contribution to the Baltic states security, by 
flying French air force air patrols over Baltic territory315 as proof that it would not 
abandon its treaty commitments.   
The other problem is that for the Baltic states the Mistral sale is merely the first of 
many future arm sales between NATO countries and Russia.  In 2010, the Russian 
Defense Ministry conducted preliminary negotiations with one of Germany’s largest 
producers of military equipment, Rheinmetall.  Russia inquired not only about possibility 
of buying the license to produce armored plates, but also signed a contract by which 
Rheinmetall will establish a tank training center in Russia as well as establish a joint 
enterprise for the repair, refurbishing, and modernization of armaments and military 
vehicles.316  Besides the Mistral, France is also in talks to provide Russia with advanced 
individual battle kits for soldiers as well as Safran-Sagem avionics for Russian fighter 
planes.317  Lastly, the Italian firm of Iveco will be producing Lynx light multi-purpose 
vehicles in cooperation with Russia.318  These recent arm sales are what the smaller 
NATO members are concerned about.  In the western countries’ rush to provide jobs for 
their populations, the Baltic states see these arms sales and assistance as proof that their 
concerns are being brushed aside. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE POTENTIAL SALE 
NATO must continue to act in solidarity to address the security concerns of 
Poland and the Baltic States.  NATO must also show that it understands these countries’ 
concerns, and not simply dismiss them.  If NATO fails in this regard, the Baltic States 
and Poland may begin to wonder what the alliance truly brings to the table for them.  To 
ensure their security, smaller member states may look toward bi-lateral relations for 
security guarantees with other nations.  Even if the countries are not the most powerful 
militarily, a relationship with another country that has the same threat perspective is an 
important consideration.  As Tomas Valasek stated, bilateral security relationships could 
“threaten to divide NATO and weaken the security of the rest of the alliance.”319  This is 
the danger that may arise if NATO does not properly react. 
Of course, it is also important to look at both sides of the argument.  NATO has 
publicly affirmed multiple times the premise of its Article 5 guarantee.  The Baltic 
nations cannot continually insist on being abandoned by their NATO allies when they 
themselves do not actively contribute to their own defense.  As Edward Lucas has 
pointed out, in terms of percent of GDP spent on defense320, Estonia will outspend both 
Lithuania and Latvia under current projections.321  Various news agencies have reported 
on the fact that there do exist NATO defense plans for the Baltic states.  So the Baltic 
states are far from abandoned. 
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There is a fine line between taking every member state’s considerations into 
account and engaging in positive relations with Russia.  Both sides have to compromise.  
The one major lesson for NATO from the Mistral sale is that consultations have to be 
much more thorough and complete.  Despite successful exercises and proclamations, all it 
takes to have members actively question each other’s motives is for communication to 
break down, which leads to suspicion.  This is especially for those countries that have a 
long, dark history with Russia.  
As already mentioned, in March 2011, reports began surfacing from Russia and 
France that the Mistral contract negotiations were at an impasse, which were soon 
dismissed by official Russian sources.  It seems the two sides are disagreeing over the 
final price and levels of technology transfer.  Some sources have indicated that the 
disagreement may be over the price tag of such electronic command and control systems 
such as the SENIT 9 and SIC-21 combat information systems.322  Other sources have 
indicated that the French are willing to sell the SENIT 9 system, but without a license for 
Russia to produce domestic versions, and have refused outright to sell the SIC-21 combat 
management system.323  
On April 25, 2011, the French Ambassador to Russia, Jean de Gliniasty 
mentioned that there were no political obstacles to the sale, but rather negotiations over 
price always take time.  He did mention that most technologies were unclassified, yet 
some technologies “those of the ship’s filling” were classified and could not be 
transferred without NATO’s consent.324  He did not specify, however, which systems he 
was referring to.  It seems as if either the French have reneged on some of their promises 
or that the Russians never specified exactly what systems they were after.  Perhaps 
internal NATO pressure caused the French to reconsider what they were willing to offer.  
One important point that has to be kept in context is that the January 25, 2010 agreement 
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between Russia and France was not a contract for four warships, but rather an 
intergovernmental agreement agreeing to the principle of a sale.  The final price and sales 
contract still has yet to be signed as of April 2011.  And reports from Russian sources 
seem to indicate the negotiation process could take months or even drag into next year 
due to the complexity of such a contract.325  
Regardless of the problems mentioned above it is still likely the sale will proceed.  
This delay in the negotiating process provides some insight into some of the true reasons 
behind the sale.  The fact that the Russians are haggling over the levels of technology 
transfer indicates that their priority is not simply getting an amphibious warship that 
Russia can outfit with its own systems.  This whole process shows how there was never a 
genuine capability assessment done on what the Russian Navy needs.  Instead, the 
Mistral may have likely been a top down decision, to buy these warships.  Pavel Baev of 
the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo argues that the Russian Navy never 
really wanted the Mistrals but was not about to turn down new ships.326  Once the 
Russian Navy was informed it was getting these ships, it would make no sense to protest 
the acquisition strongly, but now the navy had to find missions for the Mistrals to do. 
There is also the point that when the interest in Mistrals was announced, at first 
Russia was going to enter directly into negotiations with France for finalizing the sale.  
Since the Russian Defense Ministry went after a specific vessel and manufacture, it 
seems as if Russia was not interested in finding truly the best platform that would satisfy 
the capability it desired.  Rather by choosing the Mistral first, now the Russian Navy has 
to build missions to fit the Mistral’s capabilities, not the normal way of choosing a 
platform to fill a mission. 
Critics of the current Russian Navy shipbuilding plans, such as Konstantin 
Valentinovich Sivkov, the First Vice President of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical 
Problems, make the point that the Mistrals “will do nothing at all for missions facing the 
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Navy, [and] is completely extraneous.”327  While the Mistral can fill a multitude of roles, 
none of the roles it will fill is a critical need of the Russian Navy currently.  Instead of 
filling true combat roles, the Russian Navy has possibly viewed the Mistral as a center 
piece for limited projection of power over the next decade or so.  In addition to the 
possible gain of new technology, the addition of four new ships fit right into the Russian 
Navy’s plan of rapidly acquiring new warships to replace its rapidly decaying fleet.  The 
emphasis on technology, both the modern command and control systems and the 
shipbuilding technologies indicate that is not the capability that is the key desire of the 
Russians.  One other indication of the selection of a Mistral style ship is an emphasis on a 
multi-mission ship vice a warship built for a specific purpose.  A multi-mission ship, 
specifically a helicopter carrier, also gives Russia a reason to reinvest in its domestic 
helicopter industry.  There is no doubt again though, that the Russians can find suitable 
missions for the Mistrals. 
There is a lot hinging on the Mistral sale politically for both sides, and because 
France is the only country willing to go as far as it has with technology transfer, the 
Russians are not going to look elsewhere for ships.  And despite statements from 
Sevmash that they can build a Mistral themselves, there are no shipyards in Russian that 
can build a Mistral in a modular format as the French have.  In addition, the Sevmash 
Shipyard has too many current orders to add a Mistral order to its workload.328   
It is still likely that despite the issues with the negotiations in April 2011, the sale 
will be finalized between Russia and France.  What remains to be seen are the final 
details of the sale, including the final price of the contract and what technologies get 
licensed and transferred.  For Russia, the Mistral represents the best possible avenue to 
modernizing multiple facets of its navy as well as rapidly adding warships to its fleet 
rolls.  The Russian Navy will undoubtedly find roles for the Mistrals to fill, however the 
ships were not purchased to fill a glaring capability gap.  The Russian Mistrals are part of 
the means to the end (of Russian Naval modernization), not the end themselves. 
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